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Judge Parker and the
Public Service State
Peter G. Fish
On November 1, 1984, Peter G. Fish, Duke University Professor ofPolitical Science
and Law, attended the annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association in
Savannah, Georgia, where he presented a paper entitled ']udgejohnJ Parker of the
United States Court ofAppeals:judicial Apostle ofNew South Progressivism, 1925-30."
The following material is excerpted from that paper.

TO THE SUPREME COURT

Before a gathering of the White House press corps
at a four o 'clock news conference on Friday, March 21 ,
1930, President Herbert Hoover announced his nomination of John]. Parker, Judge of the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit, for AssociateJustice of the United
States Supreme Court. Although utterly lacking in
national visibility, the 44 year-old North Carolinian
brought impressive credentials: a distinguished undergraduate academic career at the University of North
Carolina from 1903-07, a year of legal education there, a
flourishing general law practice largely in his hometown of Monroe and then in the bustling commercial
center of Charlotte, and Supreme Court litigation
experience as counsel for country banks in their battle
with the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. Above all,
he possessed close ties to the "business respectable"
faction of the state Republican party His contributions
to it as a member ofJohn Motley Morehead's dominant
bloc included vigorous but fruitless campaigns as G.O .P
candidate for Congress in 1910, attorney general in
1916, and governor in 1920. Following Morehead's
death in December, 1923, Parker became national committeeman. His yeoman services to the party combined
with advocacy skills attained as a courtroom lawyer led
to appointment as Special Assistant to the Attorney General of the United States in 1923-24 during which time
he unsuccessfully prosecuted alleged war profiteers. At
the unusually young age of 40, he had been appointed
to the three-member regional appellate bench by
Hoover's predecessor, Calvin Coolidge, on October
3,1925.
[Judge Parker quickly assumed a leadership role on
the Court of Appeals, leading his proponents to praise
the nomination of this "apt representative of the 'New
South:" His critics, however, denounced him as "uncivilized;' a racist, a "sworn enemy oflabor" and representative of big business interests, and an extreme
conservative. These diametrically opposed views of
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Parker's fitness for the High Court bench led to prolonged debate in the Senate over his nomination.]
In the six-week battle over Parker's confirmation, his
record as a jurist on the United States Court of Appeals
compiled over approximately four years received little
consideration. Only his single decision affirming a lower
court injunction against the United Mine Worker's
unionization campaign in the southern bituminous coalfields drew attention. For black antagoniSts, his previous
political record, not his subsequent judicial performance, disqualified him. These antagonists prevailed
on May 7,1930, when the Senate, on a 41-39 vote
refused to advise and consent to President Hoover's
second Supreme Court nomination.
Hindsight would suggest that the Senate had erred.
But vision improved only after it became apparent that
the judicial record of substitute nominee Owen Joseph us Roberts would fall well short of meeting hopes
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held for him by Parker's opponents. But, in fact, the
North Carolinian's record made reasonably clear at the
moment of nomination both his judicial philosophy
and its antecedents.
THE PUBLIC SERVICE STATE

A. Institutional reform impulses
However much preference might be accorded the
value of private property, realization of the New South
demanded active modern government, government free
of the debilitating influence of populism yet capable of
modifying tendencies toward economic laissezjairism .
Parker stood on the platform of progressivism in advocating efficacious means for attaining a prosperous and
free society In his 1920 gubernatorial race, he identified himself as "a progressive;' while berating Democratic opponent Cameron Morrison as "a hopeless
standpatter." Manifestations of progressivism surfaced
in proposals for imposing on government institutions
Frederick W Taylor's business-based prescriptions for
efficiency, centralization, coordination, rationalization,
and integration. Inefficient state government could be
traced to a fragmented organization which, in turn, gave
rise to political irresponsibility
The solution, as Parker saw it, lay in a strong and
unified executive department. Paramount was establishment of an executive budget system analogous to that
soon to be adopted by the federal government in the
Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. Imperative too was
a shift in the source of state revenues from real property
taxes "paid by the small farmer, the home owner, and
the tenant;' to a progressive income tax "which will
recognize that we are no longer a purely agricultural
state, but have become a manufacturing and commercial state as weIr' Modern state government required an
executive veto and a council of state appointed by the
governor in lieu of the existing one whose members
were separately elected.
Once on the bench, Parker's reformist impulses
became muted, although they grew pronounced in the
1930's when he achieved national fame as·an advocate
of administrative and procedural reforms in federal and
state court systems. Glimpses of his affinity for efficient,
simple and judge-controlled case processing surfaced
in appeals presenting esoteric procedural technicalities.

On the bench, Parker's refonnist impulses
became muted
When counsel for the Great American Insurance Company complacently introduced no testimony and
serenely awaited a favorable judgment on grounds that
the insured had erroneously sought a remedy at law
rather than one in equity, Parker fairly bristled. Hailing
from a code pleading state where distinctions between
law and equity had been abolished, he demanded to

know whether appellant's counsel anticipated a favorable outcome "merely because the case was heard on
the law side . .."? Such a holding would, he warned,
"hark back to the outworn technicalities of a day that is
dead . . .." 1 Worse still, it would prove conducive to inefficient administration and consequently to burdensome
costs imposed on the plaintiff-insured. Nothing required
him to find prejudicial error and order a new trial
"where all of the evidence in the lower court is before
us, where it appears that the case was fully developed,
and where the relief obtained at law is exactly what ...
should have been awarded in equity.. .."
Reliance on technicalities associated with criminal
procedure likewise received a chilly reception. He
applied the due process "fair trial" standard in gauging
criminal procedures. But it was enough that indictments contained sufficient information "to fairly and
reasonably inform the defendants of the character of
tile offense charged ... :'2 Mere failure of indictment language "to allege that the automobile was in fact stolen
when it is alleged that the defendants on receiving it
knew it to have been stolen can be nothing more than a
defect of form which could not possibly tend to their
prejudice . . .;' he remarked in Wendell v. United States. 3
No explanation of a preference for substance over form
in criminal cases appeared in his published opinions.
But privately, he exclaimed that "it would be a reproach
to the administration of justice to allow defendants to
escape conviction on such a technicality"
B. Unshackling reserved "police powers"
The public service state envisioned by Parker clearly
emerged in numerous 1920 campaign addresses. In
common with other Soutllern progressives, his program for affirmative state activity contained a noticeable
rural tilt, intended to meet a perennial agricultural
problem distinguished by a "exodus of the farm population from the countrySide." Preservation of rural and
small-town Carolina, together with that society's vital
moral values demanded expanded governmental services and transfer of their administration from the
counties to Raleigh. Farmers would directly benefit
from centralized state-sponsored cooperative marketing and from what he called "a liberal system of rural
credits."
The paucity of two hallmarks of twentieth century
civilization constituted a major impetus for the rural
exodus, Parker believed. In advocating good roads and
good schools, he reportedly "went as far, if not fartller,
than any other candidate." The motoring buff and
member of the state's Good Roads Association decried
North Carolina's highway construction efforts and called
for a program financed by borrowing, the interest and
principal to be met by automobile and gasoline taxes.
North Carolina schools were as poor as its roads, especialy in rural districts. "We must create a state system of
public schools;' he urged, "a system in which the state
collects the school money and distributes it so as to give
the children in every county an equal opportunity for
education:' Higher teachers' salaries, free books, voca-
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tional education, and even improved mental health
facilities all became possible with a unified and efficient
government pursuing priorities vital to a modern state.
No predisposition to second-guess or to nullify governmental acts marked Parker's jurisprudence from
1925 to early 1930. On the contrary, his decisions suggest a solicitude for often hard-pressed state and municipal governments sometimes impaled on unforeseen
consequences of their modernization efforts. Even in
mundane contract actions, a recognition of an interrelationship between law and politics surfaced. The novice

His decisions suggest a solicitude for
often hard-pressed state and municipal
governments.
jurist reacted heatedly when a breaching contractor
sued Marion County, West Virginia, for payments due,
allowed the case to languish on the docket for four
years, suddenly brought it to trial in the midst of confusion caused by a transfer of county political control, and
won by default. 4 Privately he castigated the plaintiffs for
securing a court-ordered award "by means of conduct
which renders it unconscionable that the judgment be
allowed to stand... ." It would fall even if only private
parties were involved. "But certainly," he continued,
"where defendant is a county and where it appears . . ..
Ulat there had been a complete change of the county
officials, this court ought not allow a judgment to stand
unless it appears that the county was fairly notified that
me case was set for trial."
Political turmoil Similarly gripped a North Carolina
county government which had contracted for construction of an inaccessible highway bridge. An anti-bridge
faction subsequently gained control of the Board of
Commissioners and cancelled the contract, whereupon
me contractor blithely completed the project. His suit
for payment received a favorable answer from three
dissident members of the Board, none of whom had sat
for ten months and one of whom had actually resigned.
Yet, acting in the Board's name, they admitted fuliliability. Parker reversed.5 The contractor, he said in his
case memorandum, "had no right to increase tl1e damages by proceeding with the erection of the bridge in
me midst of tl1e wilderness, which is perfectly useless
to the county or to anybody else."
Business regulations under reserved state police
powers were deemed by Parker as conducive to economic progress, not as threats to economic enterprise.
An order by the City fathers of Lincolnton, North Carolina, directing a railroad to replace wooden bridges,
formerly specified by ordinance, with more fire resistant concrete structures met with his approval. 6 The
railroad's fusillade of objections founded on the Constitution's obligation of contract and commerce clauses

as well as on the fourteenth anlendment left him
unmoved. Perhaps more impressed with the relationship of the new bridge ordinance to the "City Beautiful"
movement than to fire safety conSiderations, Parker
reflected on the march of municipal progress occurring
since enactment of the wooden bridge ordinance in
1901. From that date, he mused in his case memorandum, "the town ofLincolnton has grown to be much
larger than formerly, the business section has spread
out beyond the bridges, streets have been paved with
concrete, and the old bridges constitute a fire menace
and are altogether unsightly and out of keeping with
the streets and other improvements within the town .. .."
Lincolnton was not unique. "Progress and development"
had visited other municipalities since the turn of the
century and required "many things . . . for the public
safety which were not necessary then." After all, "the
main street of the City is paved with concrete and asphalt,
and a steel or wooden bridge would be absolutely out
of keeping with the remainder of the street. .. ." With
such aesthetic considerations looming so large in the
mind of the "Good Roads" booster, Parker proclaimed
privately that "it is nothing but right and proper, in my
judgment, that the railroad company should be required
to construct a viaduct in keeping with the remainder of
tl1e street."
His published opinion in the Lincolnton Case manifested virtual disappearance of "City Beautiful" allusions. Parker quietly dismissed tl1e commerce clause
argument as "so frivolous as not to merit discussion;'
while he quashed the often potent substantive due process argument.
No facts are alleged upon which the conclusion can
legitimately be based that the extension of the fire limits
was not justified by the growth and development of the
town, or that the replacing of wooden by concrete
bridges was not required for the safety of the public, or
that the building of concrete bridges would entail any
undue hardship or unreasonable expense .. . ?

He acted... ((with the feeling that we
ought not interfere with the stateJs
collection of its tax if it is possible to
avoid doing so.))
The obligation of contract issue likewise received
short shrift from Parker who believed that the railroad
enjoyed at most a muniCipally-granted license, not a
vested right in its property But his formal opinion
focused on subordination of such rights to the state
police powers. Certainly, Lincolnton had never "intended
to surrender for an indefinite future the right to provide
for the safety of the public using its streets, or the right
to control, in the interest of fire prevention, the struc-
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tures to be erected in or near the center of its business
section... . And, if the town had attempted by contract
to part with such rights, the contract would have been
void, because contrary to public policy."
Two years before, Parker had Similarly eschewed
foisting a contract clause restraint on Lynchburg, Virginia, which in 1908 had granted the Lynchburg Traction and Light Company a trolley franchise. Its terms
stipulated a five-cent fare within city limits. Beyond
those limits, a six-cent fare had been authorized by the
Virginia Corporation Commission. The two decades
since issuance of the franchise brought growth to Lynchburg and its annexation of unincorporated areas in the
six-cent fare district. When in 1925 the city ordered a
fare reduction to five cents within the annexed areas,
the Company sought an injunction on grounds that the
City had violated an obligation of contract. s Parker, however, could find no contract beween the city and trolley
company mandating a six-cent fare. That higher fare had
been granted by the state agency under its police
powers, not by the city:
Parker also exercised self-restraint in other state
regulatory cases, concurring in a decision upholding
the power of Virginia's Commissioner of Fisheries to
exclude oyster harvesters from navigable waters of the
state allocated to oyster raisers.9 Similar restraint marked
his treatment of Virginia's efforts to combat cedar rust, a
fungus disease in which the fungus winters on cedar
tree hosts before disseminating spores that subsequently infect apple tree hosts. Thereafter the cedars
are reinfected and the cycle continues. Prior to development of antibiotics, the sole method of controlling the
disease required elimination of one of the two varieties
of host trees. To protect its economically valuable apple
crop, Virginia enacted the "Cedar Rust" law establishing
procedures for destruction of cedar tree hosts. Enforcement of the law by the state entomologist threatened
Kelleher, owner of a 2,200 acre Shenandoah Valley
estate, with loss of cedar trees which shaded his cattle
and beautified his mansion. He sought to enjOin
execution of the Commonwealth's regulatory statute
by raising questions of constitutional and statutory
interpretation.
To Kelleher's argument that Virginia's law had taken
his property without due process of law contrary to the
fourteenth amendment, Parker responded,
[W)e have no doubt that the enactment of the statute was
a valid exercise of the police power of the state . . . . [I)t
does not authorize the taking of one man's property for
another man's benefit, but it is a reasonable regulation of
the use of property in furtherance of the public welfare.
It authorizes the destruction of trees, which are shown
to be of but comparatively little value, only where they
constitute a menace to a great industry of the state.I a

To be sure, gentleman farmer Kelleher enjoyed a property right in his attractive cedar trees, but the due process clause did not bar Virginia from saying "that in the
enjoyment of property the owner shall not use it in

such a way as to endanger the rights and property of
others."
Having disposed of the substantive due process
issue, Parker turned to the more difficult task of construing the statute. Sections one and two of the Cedar
Rust Act of 1914 were shrouded in a degree of ambiguity sufficient to permit federal court nullification by
statutory construction. Section one declared cedar trees
within one mile of an apple orchard a public nuisance
per se and authorized the state entomologist to order
their destruction. Section two authorized him to investigate "host" cedar trees upon the request of ten freeholders and, if deemed a threat to apple trees within a
two-mile radius, order their destruction. Kelleher's
cedars lay within two miles but not within one of an
apple orchard. He contended that the two-mile radius
in the 1914 Act was a clerical error which if corrected
would read "one mile:' Not so, replied Parker:
For us to assume that the Virginia legislature intended to
change the radius of the second section also, would be
to indulge in a mere guess unsupported by the language
or the history of the act, and completely at variance with
the plain meaning of the language used. II

Eminently "more reasonable;' he thought, "as well as
more respectful to the lawmaking body of the state,
[was 1to assume that, if it had intended to amend the
second section at the time it amended the first section it
would have done so:'

Caution characterized Parker's response
to public utilities regulation.
Three-judge court colleague Henry Clay McDowell
of Virginia's Western District maintained that the 1920
amendment had left in force a one-mile radius rule in
those counties adopting the 1914 Act, a condition precedent to the law's effective operation. That the amending
legislation of 1920 had established a two-mile radius,
thereby destroying Kelleher's vested right "to possess
and enjoy cedar trees more than one mile and within
two miles of an orchard ..." rendered it suspect. And,
the failure to mention the local option provision meant
to him that the one-mile radius had not been suspended by the 1920 Act and remained the law of those
counties which had adopted it between 1914 and 1920,
unless, of course, they consented to the amendment.
McDowell would dissent on this basis. To his argument
Parker remonstrated:
When the Legislature amended the statute, it changed
that [1914) law. It did not leave the old law in existence
unaffected by the amendment, as it might have done,
and pass a new law for such counties and districts as
might thereafter adopt it. It amended the only law which
was in existence on the subject; and as that had become
by adoption the law of certain districts , it thereby
amended the law of those districts.I 2
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That it had made the 1914 Act operative only on county
consent did not impair its law-making power to amend
that law at a later time without such local approval.
How could it be otherwise, he asked McDowell?
Must the court hold that because a legislature in granting a City charter subject to adoption by referendum or
vote by governmental bodies could amend that charter
not by general legislation but only by a similar consensual mode of amendment? Such a restrictive view of
legislative power would, he warned McDowell, "lead to
endless difficulty for the courts ...." Furthermore, to
maintain, as did the district judge, that the Act of 1914
remained in its unamended pristine form in those
counties which had adopted it "would be judicial legislation and judicial legislation of the most indefensible
sort; for we would be holding the unamended statute to
be effective after it had been expressly amended by the
Legislature." More cautious phraseology on the same
point marked his opinion in the published case. But
obViously his caution extended beyond form; it pervaded the substance of his judicial philosophy. States
and their sub-divisions were not to be shackled by federal judges except in the clearest of cases.
The property rights of the Suncrest Lumber Company were, like those of estate owner Kelleher, also
subordinated to state police powers, in this instance to
that of condemnation. 13 The Delaware corporation
owned vast stands of valuable virgin spruce, hemlock,
chestnut, and yellow popular timber in western North
Carolina. At least 26,000 acres of its holdings fell within
the boundaries of the projected Great Smoky Mountains National Park. Since the mid-1920's, North Carolinians had been promoting a park in that area to serve
multiple purposes: recreation, tourism, forest, and water
preservation. But unlike parks developed on the public
domains in the West, eastern parks such as that in the
Great Smokies had to be carved out of the private
domain. To this end Congress in 1926 authorized creation of d1e Park and empowered the United States Government to accept at zero cost park lands in fee simple.
Aided by a $2,000,000 bond issue and by millions more
donated by]ohn D. Rockefeller,]r., the North Carolina
Park Commission moved to condemn and purchase its
225,000 acre share of the new Park. Lumber companies
responded by accelerating their timber cutting operations. To prevent denuding of lands within the projected Park's boundaries, the Commission enjoined
timber cutting pending condemnation proceedings, at
which point the Suncrest Lumber Company sought a
federal injunction against further state interference with
use of their mou ntain properties.
Before a three-judge district court, which included
Parker, me Commission fought and won its first serious
legal battle. Answering the plaintiffs argument that
North Carolina could not empower a state judge to
enjoin its frantic timber cutting without violating the
due process clause of the fourteenth Amendment,
Parker declared in Suncrest Lumber Co. v. North Carolina Park Commission:

It would seem self-evident that, if the State has a right to
take property for a public use, it has the right while
engaged in the act of taking to prevent it from being so
mutilated as to destroy the use which it has for the
public. 14
This power was especially necessary where, as in the
case at hand, the extent of the condemned lands were
large, the surveying process slow, and the administrative
and adjudicatory processes time-consuming. That the
Commission should be subjected to a temporary

Fourteenth amendment substantive due
process jurisprudence hardly affected
Parker's decisions.
restraining order appalled Parker. Such a course, he
objected, would delay:
acquiSition of lands for the Great Smoky Mountains Park,
a great public enterprise which should be of inestimable
value to that section of the country as a help toward
flood control and as proViding a beautiful recreation
park for the benefit of the people.
Restraining d1e Commission would emphatically not
serve the purpose of equity; it would not preserve the
status quo. Instead, such judicial intervention "would
result in depreciating the value of the property for the
purpose of which it is desired by the public."
Suncrest Lumber immediately carried Parker's decision to the United States Supreme Court, arguing their
case for a restraining order pending appeal before
Chiefjustice Taft, Circuit]ustice for the Fourth Circuit.
With the lower court's decree and opinion in hand,
Lycurgus R. Varser, attorney for North Carolina, felt confident that Parker's "admirable opinion [would be]
ample to convince . .. him that the restraining order ...
ought not to be issued." The hearing in fact went well
for the State. "The Chiefjustice complimented your
opinion-proper,y," the Lumberton lawyer and namesake of the Nintl1 Century B.C. Spartan lawgiver reported
to the Tar Heel jurist who had in his Suncrest opinion
subordinated private property rights to the public interest. The Taft Court agreed with his judgment and dismissed the company's appeal. IS
C. Nurturing state taxing power
State taxing power provides an essential support for
the public service state. Parker looked benignly on its
exercise. A graduated excise tax levied by South Carolina on local retailers of tobacco products was effected
by stamps affixed to the individual items which had
been shipped in interstate commerce and which were
ready either for transit out of state or for local sale even
if remaining in their original package. Alleging the
unconstitutionality of the tax, Charleston tobacco
dealers sought to enjoin collection by South Carolina's
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Tax Commission. Parker, in authoring the three-judge
district court's opinion, did not write on a clean state.
Early in the life of the Taft Court, a tangled mass of
precedents on state taxing powers had been sorted out
largely ... through the intra-Court lobbying efforts of
Justice Brandeis. Brandeis stressed that the key test of
constitutionality related to whether or not the state tax
fell as a direct burden on goods in their original package but "at rest" following their interstate movement.
Also considered was whether or not the tax was nondiscriminatory as between goods shipped in intrastate and
those shipped in interstate commerce. These Brandeisian principles filtered into Justice Mahlon Pitney's
opinion in Texas Co. v. Brown, 16 and into ChiefJustice
Taft's burial in Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton, 17 of the
"original package" doctrine applicable to goods which
moved only in interstate commerce.
In denying injunctive relief to the Charleston tobacco
dealers, Parker relied on the pair of Taft Court opinions
in Sonneborn Bros. and Texas Co. He observed in
Dosher v. Query:
[JJust as the commerce clause will not protect property
from taxation after its interstate journey has ended and it
has come to rest and become part of the general mass of
property within the state, neither will that clause protect
from taxation property that is still at rest and a part of
such general mass of property, even though it be
intended for export or shipment in interstate commerce,
if the movement in foreign or interstate commerce be
not actually commenced .. .. And this is true, notwithstanding the goods have been transported in interstate
commerce to the place where they are sought to be
taxed, and are intended for shipment to other states, if
they have reached the destination of their first journey
and are being held by their owner for disposition in the
ordinary course of business, and the stoppage be not a
mere temporary delay in transportation.I 8
Conceivably, the tax statute might be unconstitutional,
but if so, it was because of a conflict with the constitution of South Carolina. And, that was pre-eminently a
question to be answered in the first instance by the
Palmetto State's Supreme Court.
Less successful was Parker's attempt to free South
Carolina's taxing power from injunctive shackles in
Southern Railway Co. v. Query. 19 Claiming that state
assessments had taxed income derived from interstate
commerce and therefore had unconstitutionally burdened such commerce, the railroad sought and won,
much to Parker's chagrin, an injunction against collection of the disputed taxes. On first impression, he
doubted any need for imposing equitable restraints on
South Carolina because, as he informed one of the resident trial judges on the three-judge district court, "the
remedy at law is plain, adequate and complete:' After
all, the statute which created the state's Tax Commission
had provided that by paying under protest, the taxpayer
could sue the Commission for recovery of taxes paid,
and the Supreme Court of South Carolina had held that
such recovery could include interest as well as principal,
a holding which the Fourth Circuit judge gratuitously

pronounced as "in accordance with natural justice."
Colleague Ernest E Cochran of the Eastern District of
South Carolina, author of tl1e published opinion, took a
very different view.
Cochran maintained that in fact the aggrieved taxpayer enjoyed access only to an equitable remedy in
federal court. Contrary to Parker's contention, the district judge invoked Smith v. Reeves,20 a decision of the
United States Supreme Court which had held that an
action at law to recover tax overpayments was a suit
against the state tax commission. It was therefore a judgment to be paid directly out of the state treasury and
constituted a suit against the state barred by the eleventl1 amendment-unless the State had consented to
be sued. South Carolina had explicitly consented to be
sued, but only in its Court of Common Pleas. A perplexed Cochran laid out the legal dilemma in a long
letter to Parker. He explained:
If we say that the suit is not one against the State, then we
are deciding directly contrary to Smith v. Reeves. If we
say that the State has no right to restrict it to the Common
Pleas and that therefore a party may sue in the Federal
Court, we are directly in conflict with those decisions
which say that the State has such a right. If we say that
[the statutory consent to suit) in Common Pleas, intended
that it might also be brought in another court, then it
seems to me we do violence to the English language; for
it certainly was the intention of the framers of the Act to
restrict the suit to the Common Pleas. If we say that the
suit provided for, while it must be brought in the Common Pleas and cannot be brought in the Federal Court,
is adequate, then we are in conflict with those decisions
which establish with equal firmness the principle that
the suit must be available in the Federal Court.
Cochran concluded "tl1at the only way to give effect to
these established principles is to hold that in this case
the State has consented to be sued in the Common
Pleas; that such remedy is not available in tl1e Federal
Court, and therefore the remedy at law is inadequate,
and the interlocutory injunction should issue."
A dismayed Parker admitted the correctness of
Cochran's assessment. 'At least, I am not able logically

He believed that unleashing of the
individual's energies offered a sure route
to realization of the good society.
to combat the conclUSion;' he wrote. "Nevertheless, I
have a feeling that it is wrong, without being able to
give any very good reason for the feeling:' And, reiterating his Senior CircuitJudge, Edmund Waddill, Jr., the
Tar Heel jurist guessed he would "have to go along with
you, unless I can discover some good ground for holding the contrary" When further research failed to yield
an alternative course of jurisprudence, Parker concurred in Cochran's opinion enjoining the tax com-
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mission. He acted reluctantly and "with the feeling that
we ought not interfere with the state's collection of its
tax if it is possible to avoid doing so ...."
With the authorities against him, he felt confident
that Cochran's "fine piece of work will put the matter
squarely up to the Supreme Court, and if that Court
thinks that an injunction should not be granted in such
cases as this, it will have to modify some of its previous
decisions."

Broad construction of national
commerce power... marked his record
D. Restraining State Power
Not all state regulatory actions received Fourth Cir-

cuit approval. Caution characterized Parker's response
to public utilities regulation. Railroads and electric
power companies provided vital elements of the region's
economic infrastructure. They were themselves harbingers of progress; their franchises were "valuable not
only to the [utility1but to the community which it
serves."21 Mullins, South Carolina, therefore could not
acquire by prescription a portion of the Atlantic Coast
Line's right of way. Nor could tlle South Carolina Railroad Commission require the Southern Railway to
~witch cars from a tiny local feeder line onto the regional
carrier's tracks. 22 The state agency's order conflicted
with national commerce power and took "property
without due process of law . .. because [it 1required the
Southern Railway, without compensation, to open up
terminal facilities to competitors."
Fourteenth amendment substantive due process
jurisprudence hardly affected Parker's decisions, however much it marked tllose of the Supreme Court during Taft's chief justiceship. That public power-limiting
doctrine did figure in the unpublished three-judge district court opinion delivered by Parker in Bluefield
Water Works Improvement Co. v. Public Service Commission. 23 The Supreme Court had previously overturned both the Commission and West Virginia's high
court in a case involving the same parties. Associate
Justice Pierce Butler, writing for the Court, held that
reproduction cost, not the original cost of the Company's water works, was the proper rate base. That the
agency had "wholly disregarded" the former base notwithstanding the post-war inflationary surge in construction costs led him to ... conclude "that a rate of
return of 6 percent upon the value of the property is
substantially too low to constitute just compensation for
ule use of the property. . .." The unmistakable tenor of
Butler's message in the Bluefield Water Works litigation
doubtlessly encouraged close scrutiny of the Commission's subsequent findings. These, Parker deemed in
error. They underrated interest paid by the utility on
new construction as well as the Company's "going

value;' and the seven and one-half percent on capital he
deemed inadequate.
"Taking all these things into consideration;' the circuit judge opined "that the complainants have made a
showing, probably, for, and that they are entitled to, the
preliminary injunction [for 1which they pray." But he
granted the injunction with strings attached. The Commission was restrained from enforcing its order or from
interfering with the plaintiffs in putting into effect the
schedule of rates in accordance with this order. ..." The
temporary injunction also limited the Company from
fixing rates which exceeded by more than ten percent
those previously approved by the Commission, and
required that strict accounting be made of the rate
increase, and that a $25,000 bond be posted from which
refunds to ratepayers might be distributed should facts
found on a final hearing warrant. The Court subsequently dismissed the suit following agreement by the
Commission and the Company on "the fair value for
rate making purposes ... of the plant and property," on
"a fair return ... of eight ... percent," and on a new rate
schedule.
CONCLUSION

Whatever Parker's public image molded in the
weeks following nomination to the Supreme Court, his
judicial record remains as clear today as it was from
March to May 1930. No clairvoyance is required now,
nor was it needed then to classify Parker's jurisprudence articulated as a member of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit from late 1925
to March 1930. Combined with the public record made
as a politiCian, attorney, and civic leader prior to ascending the appellate bench, his status as a New South progreSSive is evident. He articulated typical tllemes of
progressivism in his speeches, decrying turmoil and
moral erosion and questing for order and oppportunity
in society. Uplifting of citizens to new heights required
social regulation-control of liquor, suffrage for
women, disfranchisement of blacks. Yet in speaking
to these impassioned issues of public policy as a jurist,
Parker treated them not as a zealot, but with the caution

Reliance on technicalities associated
with criminal procedure... received a
chilly reception.
and study befitting a federal judge.
In common with progressives generally, he sought
no radical transformation of society. The linchpin of
society was the individual and, in the tradition of tlle
previous century, he believed that unleashing of the
individual's energies offered a sure route to realization
of the good society. Essential to that end was protection
of private property, especially that created byenterprising individuals. This theme coursed most promi-
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nently through his opinions relating to patents, federal
taxation of business corporations, and in his single
Sherman Anti-Trust Act case between private businessfirm litigants.
Tempering an affinity for property rights was a
recognition of the necessity for the "public service"
state as an instrument for promoting New South economic growth. Parker's embrace of "business progressivism" became manifest in this context. An enthusiasm
for reform of governmental structure surfaced in judicial opinions giving short shrift to archaic and complex
legal procedures. No "judiCial legislator," his Cedar Rust
and Suncrest Lumber opinions made clear a concern
for unshackling the reserved police powers of the several states and, in his vindication of state taxing power,
the ability to raise revenues necessary for development
of public services. Restraints on state powers might be
required, especially by the imperatives of the Taft Court's
jurisprudence. But as suggested in the Bluefield Water
Works case, he sought a middle ground in simultaneously restraining both the state agency and the private enterprise.
As with exercises of state power, so with those of the
national government, the North Carolina jurist proved
no "man against the state." His decisions in major civil
and criminal litigation favored the federal government
as against the interests of private businesses, even innocent enterprises. Broad construction of national commerce power was manifested in his controversial labor
injunction opinion, United Mine Workers ofAmerica v.
RedJacket Consolidated Coal and Co., involving
application of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act to unionization
campaigns.z s Parker's judicial record likewise reveals a
propensity for defending the essential tenet of the New
South creed: regional economic growth. His record suggests an abiding concern for providing federal judicial
protection to the region's economic infrastructure, to
its public utilities and rail carriers as well as to its
shippers, entrepreneurs, and consuming members of the
public. His search for the point at which interstate
freight rates applied reflect this concern. So too did
constraints placed on the Interstate Commerce Commission in his Lake Cargo decision, a decision which
encouraged public policy favorable to a labor-intensive
industry of the New South in its intersectional com-

petition for markets. 26 RedJacket also manifested a
Similar interest on Parker's part. But tl1at case forced a
balanCing of deeply felt sympathy for laboring men anc
women, a sympathy articulated in his gubernatorial
campaign addresses and in other judicial decisions
involving members of the working class. Yet, his moderate treatment of the scope of the injunction affirmed
against John L. Lewis and his United Mine Workers of
America went largely unnoticed in the passionate
debates on confirmation. And, in the boiling cauldron
of Supreme Court confirmation politiCS a jurist bearing
New South progressive credentials became a veritable
political ogre to critical elements of Franklin Roosevelt'l
future constituency.
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Moral Values in Legal Education
Richard C Maxwell*

The American Bar Association
Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
adopted in 1983, provide that a lawyer acting as advisor to a client may
properly "refer to relevant moral and
ethical considerations in giving
advice." Further, a lawyer may tenninate the representation of a client if
"the client insists on a repugnant or
imprudent objective." If moral values
are to guide professional action, it is
fair to ask to what extent moral education is a part of the law school
experience.
Law schools teach law; that is,
they teach a body of principles, rules,
and decisions. They also teach a way
of working with these formulations
in their application to that level of
reality which stands as facts in the
classroom. Lawyers must try to predict what will happen to their clients
if a particular course of action is
taken. They must also try to achieve a
beneficial result if their clients have
already taken ill-advised actions. To
relate these objectives to moral considerations suggests that the lawyer's
evaluation of the client's situation can
be gauged by some accepted moral
standard.
If that standard can be found in
religion, the source and authority of
the values applied are comfortably
explicable in traditional terms. If,
however, the reference is to a moral
order not founded on generally
accepted divine revelation, actions
taken in its name must be defended
pragmatically or by reference to the
human reasoning process. Personal
moral standards applied in a legal
context are bound to be affected by
the moral underpinnings of the legal
system.
American law no longer operates,
even verbally, as though it rested on
supernatural foundations. Legislatures and judges declare law in the
American system and when the legislatures declare it, the courts interpret

Richard Mcu'Well

it and sometimes, using the Constitution, our closest equivalent to publicly accepted holy writ, pronounce
its nullity.
The work of judges and legislators is frequently subjected to critical
analysiS. Sometimes this process
focuses on the technical nuances of
how the job has been performed but
frequently the criticism seems to
measure tl1e results against some system of values, assuming standards
that go beyond a personal morality.
The idea that such standards are
being utilized is strengthened by the
fact that law exists to govern relation-

Law exists to govern
relationships between
human beings and not the
actions of individuals in a
vacuum.
ships between human beings and
not the actions of individuals in a
vacuum.
If the moral content of law is not

referred for authority and substance
to a formal religiOUS matrix, from
what source is this element of the
system derived? Lawyers, in commo(
with otl1er human beings, bring to
any decision or assertion of opinion
a melange of beliefs, traditions, and
intuitions as to what is good, bad,
useful, and destructive. Sometimes
these elements have been carefully
nurtured in the formal study of religion, philosophy, history, or economics. The study of law itself can
also supply a source of guidance
for decisions on moral matters.
The law consists of a myriad of
determinations and judgments on
human relationships. In law school,
many of these determinations are
studied and weighed against each
other, and against the beliefs, traditions, and intuitions which faculty
and students bring into the classroom. In this sense, a great deal of
law school time is spent in moral
education. Meaning is given, in relation to particular facts, to such words
as justice, fairness, and responsibilit}j
Yet, questions of ends and values are
a part of legal education only within
a rather narrow professional
framework.
Law students, in common with
other human beings, have a taste for
certainty, but legal education does
little to satisfy it. The process subject.'
assertions of certitude in the governance of human affairs to severe tests.
This aspect of the educational experience extends to moral values. It
becomes obvious that human reason
is a limited tool for resolving in a
satisfying way differences in the
beliefs to which people adhere. It is
possible that students are left with
the idea that it is not productive to
spend too much time in thinking
about tl1e ageless questions of good
and evil.
In many professional situations
the values involved are seen to be
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gi\'en--they are the values of the
client. Law is viewed as a means for
achieving goals which the client
wishes to achieve. A faith emerges,
but it is a faith in process: that the
application of reason within a procedural structure governed by the general values of the Constitution will
produce good long term results for
society or, at least, an acceptable
resolution of a current problem.
The idea of improving the human
condition in the long run or of
decently resolving a dispute between
indi\'iduals in the short run includes
value judgments as to what is
improvement and what is decency
Many law students bring with them
to law school strongly held views of
how the world should work. As their
perception as to how the world does
work diverges from this model, their
expectations of attaining a profesSional role that will fulfill their high
ideals and values may moderate.
It is in the examination of the

Law students... have a
taste for certainty, but legal
education does little to
satisfy it

demands of the professional role that
the law school has found its most
important mechanism for the direct
discussion of moral issues. As noted
at the outset of this discussion, the
Rules of Professional Conduct make
direct reference to moral standards,
providing for "optional withdrawal"
from representation of a client who
wishes to take an advantage of
another that the lawyer finds "repugnant." This advantage is by hypothesis
legal, since an illegal course of conduct, under the Rules, calls for
"mandatory withdrawal" from representation of the client who insists
upon it. Where the results the client
seeks are merely "repugnant;' the
lawyer's course of action is a matter
of individual preference. If one lawyer withdraws, the client is free to
seek another who will exercise his
individual moral preferences
differently
What does this mean for the professional education of lawyers? The
tradition of loyalty and commitment
to the client will often mean that the
lawyer will choose to give candid
moral advice to the client but will
then follow the client's wishes and
do for the client's cause, if that is the
client's wish, that which is lawful
even though unfair or unjust. At the
action stage of the lawyer/client relationship, the value system of the

At the action stage of the
lawyer/Client relationship)
the value system of the
lawyer becomes irrelevant
lawyer becomes irrelevant. It is to be
hoped, however, that some experience in examining troubled situations in terms of moral values will
increase a student's skill in dealing
with such problems and lend force to
the use of "relevant moral and ethical
considerations in giving advice." At
least, a student so exposed will enter
practice sensitized to the difficulty of
asserting non-obligatory moral principles when acting in a professional
role which places a very high value
on loyalty to the client.

*Richard C. Maxwell is the Harry R.
Chadwick, Sr., Professor in the School
of Law. This essay appeared in Duke
University Letters (Sept. 5, 1984).
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Thoughtson
Attorney Competence
J Porter Durham *
Lord Coke captured the essence
of the problem which those concerned about young lawyer competence clearly see:

Still others contend that the
American lawyer has 19st his social
and public character. In the Preface
to Joel Seligman's tbe High Citadel,
Ralph Nader challenges lawyers and
law schools to remember the unique
public character of their mission, as
summarized by AZ. Reid years
earlier:

No man can be a complete lawyer
by universality of knowledge without experience in particular cases,
by bare experiences without universality of knowledge; he must be
both speculative and active, for the
science of laws, I assure you, must
joyn hands with experience.1
Each day, the law student encounters the handiwork of incomplete
lawyers and the criticisms of a lawyer-weary society Often, the cases
studied exhibit poor legal skills
which leave one party without adequate representation and at the
mercy of an unsavory opponent with
a weaker case. Although such study is
the prevalent method of "learning
the law," many students believe the
experience one-dimensional, lacking
in practical content. After three years
of casebook learning and a few
selected encounters with limited
clinical programs, the graduate is
expected to pass the bar and begin
practice, completely prepared and
fully "competent."
During the past fifteen years it
has been argued that the novitiate, as
well as the profession as a whole,
lacks some yet defined quality or
status. Some in the profession believe
that there is an absence of skill at
bar-an inability to do whatever it is
that lawyers are supposed to do.
Howard H. Kestin, chief administrative law judge and director of the
New Jersey Office of Administrative
Law, has said flatly:
Law practice is both a science and
an art. Law school graduates have
firm foundations in the science of
law, but they know little of the art of

]. Porter Durham

practice-the application of the science-perhaps less than their
entering counterparts in other
professions. 2
Others suggest that tl1ere are
problems with the lawyer's attitude
and personal skills. As Professors
Shaffer and Redmount have stated:
Lawyers prefer an impersonal coolness. They avoid strictly human
encounters. They seize . .. opportunities to put distance between
themselves and people who need
them. Problems are seen as opportunities for investigation, defense,
abstract persuasion, and argument,
rather than as opportunities for
involvement. Even when tlle problem calls for moralism ... the moralism selected is the lawyer's
moralism: lawyers are uninterested
in the moral impulses of their
clients.
[Lawyers] tend to deal with human
feelings by ignoring tl1em when
possible, and battering them away
when they will not be ignored. They
prefer faith in words to faith in
people.3

Practicing lawyers do not merely
render to the community a social
service, which the community is
interested in having them render
well. They are part of the governing
mechanism of the state. [L]awyers
were instituted, as a body of public
servants, essential for the maintenance of private rights. 4
The criticism and the not so
subtle reminders of our professional
mission from within the profession
have been matched in intensity by
those outside of it. The public has
little or no faith in the legal system,
or in tl1e lawyer's ability to handle
problems and to address the major
issues of the day with skill or intelligence. Ann Strick, in her book
Injustice For All, broadly attacked the
adversarial nature of the legal system
and stated that it subverts justice and
victimizes the victim. s Morris Harrel,
ABA President from 1982 to 1983,
argued that the public's lack of trust
in the profession had become so
intense that the ABA should commit
whatever resources necessary to
enhance the public's understanding
of the profession and to deliver the
"highest quality of justice" possible. 6
Historically, the lawyer has suffered great slings and arrows. Students are told routinely that this
criticism is attributable to the fact
that lawyers are often litigious adversaries who find themselves embroiled
in knotty problems which are
unpleasant and highly personal. Law-
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rers are the "champions" of unpopular causes which are perceived as
inherently evil or "lawless." However,
this familiar litany has not satisfied
those who continue to challenge the
lawyer's character and his competence and to question his role in
society

Each day, the law student
encounters the handiwork
of incomplete lawyers and
the criticisms of a lawyerweary society.
In response to the criticism, and
out of an awareness of some of these
problems, many members of the profession and interested scholars have
spoken out and offered criticisms of
their own. Derek Bok has suggested
that the law and tl1e legal system have
become too obscure, too expensive,
and too burdensome. He contends
U1at the law schools are only havens
for good minds unable to find otl1er
direction, and that often, tl1e talent is
wasted mere? President Giamatti of
Yale has suggested mat undergraduate schools should teach general
and pre-law courses to better inform
the public and better prepare the
interested student. 8 Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor has been highly critical of law schools "preoccupied with
legalisms" and neglectful of the
teaching of practical skills and, perhaps more importantly, ethical
responsibility9 The American Bar
Association has cited with approval
the efforts of New Jersey and New
Hampshire to strengthen the bar by
requiring "transition education"
between law school and law practice.
However, at the same time it is
admitted that the number of these
programs is small and mat, overall,
the competence problem is "so real,
in fact, mat it qualifies as a crisis in
our profession." 10
In an effort to address tl1e "competence problem" in North Carolina,
the state bar association studied the
feasibility of creating practical skills

courses, local bar support groups,
and programs to strengthen trial
advocacy skills. Those efforts were
considered pOSitive post-law school
steps toward acquainting the law
school graduate with tl1e practical
aspects of his profeSSion, thereby
enhancing his professional competence. It was believed that another
possible benefit, increased "social"
competence, would accrue as well.
Perhaps this heightened senSitivity to
social needs and a greater sense of
professional commitment would
restore to the profession some of tl1e
elan that it has lost.
However, tl1ese worthy efforts will
be of little or no value if law school
graduates who come to the bar are
already "professional misfits" with
little practical training, social inSight,
or personal integrity Thus, the various state bars should focus meir
attention not on "gap bridging" or
transitional education, but on the law
schools tl1emselves. What happens

State bars should focus
their attention not on ((gap
bridging)) or transitional
education, but on the law
schools themselves.
within a law school's walls is critical,
because it is the seed bed of the
profession.
PRACTICAL TRAINING

The desire to enhance the new
lawyer's practical skills begs a
broader question about the nature
and form of legal education. Law
schools currently rely, in large part,
on a standard curriculum, taught
using the casebook method and tl1e
Socratic dialogue. Some believe,
however, that law students should
participate in a very different kind of
educational experience before they
ever reach the local bar. I I Stanford
Professor Lawrence M. Friedman has
argued that legal education should
consist of one-half clinical training
and one-half intellectual training-

essentially toughening the mind
while honing the skills. 12 This course
of study, known as "Curriculum B;'
was tested at Stanford UniverSity and
has, according to Professor Paul Brest,
produced lawyers who are more
skeptical, more sensitive, and more
reflective, as well as more technically
able.13 Duke Law School recently
expanded its curricular and extracurricular programs to include a
unique commercial practice course
which pits one student team against
anotl1er in Simulated commerciallitigation. The problems are created
and tl1e progress of the actions are
supervised by several attorneys across
the country Duke's new Private Adjudication Center will provide needed
negotiations experience to balance
the emphasis on oral advocacy skills.
These programs are, in effect, like
those recommended in the Cramton
Report, which argued strenuously for
instruction in basic skills all lawyers
need: effective writing, persuasive
speech, proper negotiation techniques, and personal counseling. 14
By and large, however, the profession remains wedded to the conventional methods of instruction. New
topiCS of some significance are often
forced into the casebook mold
whether tl1ey fit or not. One important example should be related.
In the aftermath of tl1e Watergate
scandal, me so-called "lawyers'
scandal;' the study of legal ethics,
using the ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility, became a part of tl1e

By and large ... the profession remains wedded to
the conventional methods
of instruction.
law school curriculum. Unfortunately,
rather than teaching mis course with
very practical hypothetical situations
as models over a semester, schools
often wedge it into a one-week session, using a casebook. Students go
through the motions of "learning
about" ethics, quickly complete the
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requirements, and lose, or never discover, the real significance of the
subject matter. If anything, their cynicism about "legal ethics" grows.
SOCIAL COMPETENCE

In 1617, Lord Bacon implored
the justices of the Star Chamber to
"[ dJo good to the people, love them,

New topics .. . are often
forced into the casebook
mold whether they fit
or not.
and give them justice, [b Jut let it be
as the Psalm saith, 'look for nothing
in return, neither praise, nor profit.' " 15
He was telling them to be mindful of
the public welfare and of their
responsibility as professionals to
society generally; without thought of
personal gain. He was describing
what can be called social competence-the ability to deal with other
lawyers, other troubled people, or
complex moral or ethical dilemmas
with sensitivity; patience, and conscience. This type of "competence" is
a vital complement to practical competence and its renewal may well be
the only way that the profession can
rescue itself from low public esteem.
Law students are usually bright,
competitive people. They often bring
to school great notions of peace and
justice and certain skills which they
hope will be refined to serve positive
ends and to help them become "good
lawyers."17 It is this combination of
highly talented and highly motivated
people which creates, in the law
school, a fertile environment for discourse on sensitive and controversial
topicS (within the context of the law).
These same people, once graduated,
take up the practice of law, or engage
in other fields where their knowledge may be applied.
However, the practicing attorney
is a reflection, not only of the skill
and ideas he brought to the law
school or of the training he received
there, but also of the conditions

under which he was trained. Often,
the progressive dialogues can
become skewed, and the learning
process cut off for many students by
school reward systems which reinforce certain narrowly defined skills
or attributes while ignoring others.
Students, in their drive to "succeed"
in law school and win the honors
that will assure easy job placement,
distort healthy competition and further charge an already intense environment. As pressures mount, getting on the law review or making the
moot court team may become more
impOltant than the learning and
talent such activities seek to distinguish. Some choose to pursue
these goals at any cost, with certain
ends justifying any means. In this
climate, it becomes easier to forget
or to ignore the most important and
most baSic of the lawyer's professional values: honor, duty to client,
and community responsibility The
conscience and character of the law
student are often battered or broken
by the law school process. Seldom
recognized and never rewarded, they
languish. The notions of peace and
justice are buried by piles of cases
and statutes, seldom to be heard
from again. It has been argued that
the debilitation of law students is not
a function of the law school environment but of the inadequacy of the
students themselves. A study conducted by Dean Paul D. Carrington
while at the University of Michigan
Law Schoop8 indicated that one

student and faculty morale. He argues
that one way to avoid this problem is
to identify, by profile, the people
likely to become "turned-off;' "teedoff;' or "overly lonely," and reject
them before they enter the school.
Yet, Professor Shaffer, in the
Preface to Swygert and Battey's Maximizing the Law School Experience,

The conscience and
character of the law
student are often battered
or broken by the law
school process.
presents a peSSimistic view of the law
school's interaction with and development of personal character and
conscience:
It is not true that the American lawyer-heroes found their moral substance in the profession. They found
their moral substance ... in their
families , their church , and their
community. [L)awyers of character,
lawyers worthy of moral leadership
America thrusts on them , were good
lawyers because they were good
people to begin with. They had the
goodness before they became lawyers. The moral challenge in their
learning the law was to hold on [to
their integrity).18
CONCLUSION

Students go through the
motions of {(learning
about" ethics ... and lose, or
never disco Vet; the real
significance of the subject.
in seven Michigan law students
"dropped out" emotionally and intellectually without formally withdrawing from school. Carrington categorizes these people as either alienated
or dissatisfied and suggests that the
result of such poor attitudes is lower

Students are told throughout
their first year of law school that the
experience will shape them profesSionally If this is the case, perhaps
the mold should be reexanlined. The
public's perception of lawyers as feechasing cutthroats, bent on winning
at any cost may be accurate-and
may be a direct result of a climate
which is character-debilitating rather
than character enhancing. The current environment at many of the
country's best schools stifles the vel)'
ethical and human sensitivities without which even the most technically
proficient graduates cannot practice
effectively Moreover, without these
sensitivities, the lawyer cannot ade-
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quatel), face the challenges which
society places before him, or confront the problems which he, as a
lawyer, cannot ignore.
In order to achieve the goals of
greater practical and social competence, the members of the legal profession must insist that law schools
accept not only good students but
good people as well; that they teach
basic skills with basic theory; and that
they frame the competitive spirit
with conscience. Only if the legal
profession reassesses some of its
most basic assumptions about the
form and nature of legal education
and the current role of lawyers in
society will it overcome the view of
some within the profession and many
outside of it that:
[T]he things we admire in men, kindness and generosity, openness,
honesty, understanding, and feeling
are the concomitants of failure in
our system. And those traits we
detest, sharpness, greed, acquisitiveness, meanness, egotism, and selfinterest are the traits of success. 19

*j. Porter Durham, a 1985 j.D. graduate andformer President of the
Duke Bar Association, presented the
substance of this paper in a statement to the Committee on the
Competence ofNew Admittees of the
North Carolina Bar Association, on
March 30, 1984
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"Freedom" & "Coercion"Vtrtue Words & Vice Words
Peter Westen

Peter Westen, Professor ofLaw at the University ofMichigan, delivered the address
excerpted below as the 1984-85 Currie Lecture at Duke Law School. The text will appear
in full in a forthcoming issue of the DUKE LAWJOURNAL. Considerable controversy
resultedfrom publication ofThe Empty Idea ofEquali~ 95 HARV. L. REv. 537 (jan.
1982), an article with a theme similar to this lecture. Interestingly enough, Mr. Westen
said he had changed his mind since writing the Equality article. He no longer feels we can
segregate the language of law from that of everyday life. He now feels we should
"unpack" such concepts to fully realize their hidden prescriptive/descriptive elements.
Three special guests attended the Lecture: Mrs. Brainerd Currie and Mr. & Mrs. john H
Lewis. Mrs. Currie's husband taught Conflict ofLaws at Duke Law School; the lecture
series is in his memory. Mr. Lewis aD. 1967) is the current patron of the lecture. Also in
the audience were Professor Dellinger; who clerked with Mr. Westen on the Us. Supreme
Cour~ and Professor Beale, who had been his student

I. INTRODUCTION

Much has changed since 1781 when ThomasJefferson wrote of "freedom" and "coercion;' and even
more since Plato discussed these topiCS two millennia
hence. Different ways of life have engendered different
societal and personal philosophies, values, and ideals.
For instance, the United States' short lifetime has witnessed the abolition of slavery, the demise of monarchies, the prohibition of torture, the banning of child
labor, the prevalence of premarital sex, and the creation
of no-fault divorce.
Despite the world's vast transformations, we use the
same phrases to laud and condemn. Very different conceptions of good and evil are expressed with identical
language: "freedom;' "equality," "justice;' "misery,"
"shame;' and "coercion." A major subset of the recurring terms of moral discourse are "virtue words" and
"vice words."
Virtue words and vice words are both protean and
nonlexically normative.
First, like the Greek god Proteus, each has the capaCity to
retain its own essential identity while Simultaneously
assuming a variety of distinct and even contradictory
forms. Virtue words and vice words possess ... the quality of being less than fully specified and hence ... capable of further specification.

Virtue words and vice words convey judgments of
right or wrong without being defined as expressing
normative values.

Peter Westen

[S]ome concepts in normative discourse, like the concept of "rights" and the concept of "duress," are normative by definition. They are "value concepts ...." It is
paradoxical to speak negatively of rights or to speak
positively of duress, because the relationship between
rights and legitimacy, and duress and illegitimacy, is not
contingent. It is lexical. ...
One does not misuse language when one condemns
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equality or praises inequality, because while statements
of equality and inequal ity tend to be statements of good
and bad, and right and wrong, respectively, the relationship between equality and virtue and inequality and vice
is not lexical. It is contingent.
Because virtue words and vice words are protean,
they are versatile. Deeply-held moral beliefs can be
expressed by the same term even though morally inconsistent. Because they are non-lexically normative, they

Very different conceptions ofgood

and evil are expressed with identical
language.
persuade without being condusory Moral discourse is
tilted in the direction the speaker wishes, yet an opponent cannot protest that tile issue has simply been
defined awa), Combined, these two features of virtue
words and vice words generate great rhetorical force.
"Freedom:' a virtue word prototype, will be analyzed in detail to enhance our understanding of its rhetorical power.
Freedom is protean, because freedom is a single, generic
concept that can Simultaneously encompass many different and morally contradictory conceptions .... Freedom is also non-lexically normative, ... it tends to be
"laudatolT" without being defined as [such] .... [I]t is
generally assumed to be something right and good; yet
there is nothing contradictory about "bad" or "undesirable" ... freedoms.
"Coercion:' a vice word prototype, will be "unpacked" in the same manner to reveal its core concepts.
Like freedom, coercion is a single concept that is sufficiently open-textured to encompass a range of diverse
and mutually inconsistent norms. As well, the word can
be used correctly, yet advance normatively inconsistent
positions.
[Cloercion" .. . is generally derogatory, but there is
nothing contradictory about the notion of justified or
legitimate coercion.
Shared notions of good and evil drive virtue words
and vice words less than their connotative meaning.
Much of their rhetorical force is semantic, not
substantive.
II. FREEDOM

[Freedoms] consist of three impliCit terms; an agent or
class of agents, X, who possess the stated freedom; a
constraint or a set of constraints, Y, that inhibits agent X
from doing or being something he may wish ... ; and the
goal, Z, that constraint Y inhibits agent X from doing or
being if he so chooses. The concept of freedom is a
generic relationship among X, Y, and Z; It is the relationship of an agent X,from a constraint Y, to do or be a goal,
Z, that he may desire.

Depending upon wh ich of two relations exists
between agents X and constraints Y, freedoms are either
descriptive or prescriptive. While the distinction
between these categories is Significant, both types of
freedoms are equally genuine. Descriptive relationships are where
X is unconstrained by Y to pursue Z, without regard to
whether he also ought to be unconstrained ....
An example is "The prisoner is free to walk without
shackles." From descriptive statements, nothing prescriptive necessarily follows.
The Bill of Rights refers to prescriptive freedoms.
These exist where
X stands in a relationship to Y and Z such that he is
and ought to be unconstrained by Y to pursue Z.
Every statement of freedom, then, expresses either
an "is" or an "is and ought to be."
To speak of "freedom; ' therefore, is either to say something neutral-[which] ... cannot be inferred to be
either good or bad-or to say that something ought to
be; but it is never to say that something ought not to be.
To be sure, one can say that a particular descriptive
freedom is undesirable, or that a particular prescriptive
freedom is unsound, or that a particular agent ought not
to be free from Y to pursue Z. But in order to convey that
a particular freedom is unjust or unsound, one must say
so expressly, because the word freedom ... does not
itself ever say that "X ought not to be free from Y to do
or be Z."
III. COERCION
Although a person who is coerced is not free, coercion is not merely the converse of freedom. An agent
can lose or gain freedom without being coerced. Moreover, unlike freedom, coercion presupposes a human
agent (X-I). It is an interpersonal relation where one
person affects tlle behavior of another.
X-I must knowingly bring a constraint upon X for
the purpose or with tile expectation of causing X to do
or become 2-1 against her will.

[T]he "absence of will" alone does not suffice to render
the event "against the will" unless the event is also
against [personal] wishes . . . . [Suppose a man] wanted to
jump but being too scared to do so on his own, hoped
someone would push him, we would not say that he
entered the water "against his will." ... [0 ]ne can constrain X to do Z-1 "against the will" by so structuring the
relative consequences ofX's doing Z-1 as opposed to not
doing Z-1 as to cause X to choose [what] ... would not
otherwise [be chosen).
A constraint is coercive regardless of whether it
achieves its purpose. The term "coerce" alone does not
imply success, but "coerce into" does.
To say that X-I "coerced X into" doing something means
th:lt X chose to do something . . . that but for the constraint or promise of constraint X-I brought to bear, X
would not have chosen to do.
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X must also be aware of the constraint that X-I is
bringing to bear to force the course of action, Z-I.
Finally, coercion must render Z-1 more "eligible"
(attractive) in X's eyes than it would otherwise be under
the circumstances. It must supply the actor with a reason
to do X-l's bidding.
Like freedom, all coercion is either prescriptive or
descriptive, depending on the relevant baseline. Prescriptive, or normative, coercion leaves X in a worse
position relative to a baseline level than she ought to be
for refusing to do what X-I proposes.
Descriptive coercion exists when X is left worse off
than she otherwise expects to be, relative to a particular
baseline. The combination of prescriptive and descriptive qualities renders "coercion" a vice word. The essential elements of coercion, then, are:
[AJ constraint or promise of a constraint, Y, that X-I
knowingly brings to bear on X in order that X choose to
do something, Z-I , that X would not otherwise do and
that X does not wish to be constrained to do- where X
knows that X-I is bringing or promising to bring Y to
bear on him for that purpose, where Y renders X's doing
Z-1 more eligible to X than Z-1 would otherwise be, and
where Y leaves X worse off either than actually expected
otherwise or than he ought to be for refusing to do X-I 's
bidding.
Iv. CONCLUSION

What can we learn from "freedom " and "coercion"
about virtue words and vice words? What gives freedom
and coercion their protean, open-textured quality? What
is it that makes "freedom " sound good and "coercion"
sound bad without their being defined as good and bad?
"Freedom" and "coercion" each have three features
that explain their being virtue words and vice words.
Both consist of certain fixed elements, as well as variables. They are, therefore, sufficiently elastic to encompass morally inconsistent conceptions.
The second significant feature that freedom and coercion both possess is that neither can be reduced solely
to prescriptive statements, because both also take
descriptive forms .... [Finally], just as freedom and coercion cannot be reduced exclusively to prescriptive statements of "ought" or "ought not; ' they cannot be reduced
exclusively to descriptive statements of "is.". . .
Freedom and coercion are useful, because they serve
the same purpose in moral discourse that large, allpurpose vessels serve in the field: they can contain and
carry a wide diverSity of particular contents without
altering their nature .. .. The words "freedom " and "liberty" are related, because they both refer to a relationship in which an agent X is unhindered by a constraint Y
to do something Z. But liberty is less versatile and, to
that extent, less useful than freedom, because liberty is a
subset of all freedoms. We use "liberty" to refer to a
relationship in which a particular class of agents (i.e.,
purposeful agents) are unhindered by a particular class
of constraints (i.e., human constraints), to pursue their
goals ... .

It is lingUistically useful to have special-purpose
words like "liberty" that are tailored to a narrow range of
tasks; but it is also linguistically useful to have multipurpose words like "freedom " that can perform many
tasks.
The same is true of the relationship berween "coercion" and "duress." Coercion and duress are related,
because they both involve threats that X-I brings to bear
on X to do something, Z-I, that X would not othelwise
choose to do. Coercion is broader and, to that extent,
more versatile than duress; because duress is solely a
prescriptive concept encompaSSing constraints to leave
X worse off than she ought to be left, while coercion can
encompass either prescriptive or descriptive constraints.
Again, it is useful to have special-purpose words like
duress that take only a prescriptive form. But it is also
useful to have multi-purpose words like ... coercion that
can express both descriptive and prescriptive
relationships.
Although the capacity of "freedom " and "coercion"
to express both descriptive and prescriptive relations is
hnguistically useful, it is also rhetorically treacherous
because it
causes us to unthinkingly blend the rwo kinds of relationships together. Instead of recognizing that prescriptive freedoms are good because they are defined to be
good, and that descriptive freedoms themselves are neither good nor bad, we carelessly come to believe that all
freedoms are presumptively good. Instead of remembering that prescriptive coercion is bad because it is
defined to be bad, and that descriptive coercion itself is
neither good nor bad, we carelessly assume that all coercion is presumptively bad. Rather than demand moral
argument in favor of particular freedoms, and moral
argument against particular kinds of coercion, we come
to believe that freedom is itself something to favor and
coercion itself something to oppose . . . .
[T]here is nothing in their being "freedoms" and
"coercions" that makes them presumptively good or
bad. A person who advocates a particular freedom
ought to give reasons for believing that a particular X
ought to be unhindered by a particular Y to pursue a
particular Z. Calling it "freedom" is either a neutral
description or a question-begging conclUSion, but it is
not a reason for believing X ought to be unrestrained by
Y to pursue Z. By the same token, a person who opposes
a particular coercion ought to give reasons for believing
that a particular proposal leaves X worse off than X
ought to be left for refusing to do X-l 's bidding. Calling
the proposal "coercive" is either a neutral description
or a question-begging conclUSion, but it is not a reason
for belieVing that X-I proposes to leave X worse off than
X ought to be left. The danger with words like freedom
and coercion is that by mixing descriptions with prescriptions, they tend to persuade us not through . . .
reasons but through tricks of language. They possess
rhetorical force not by facilitating argument, but by
bypassing it. They are words that lay claim to virtues
they do not deserve, and to vices they do not possess.
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AConference Report

GunControl
A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security ofa free State, the right of the
people to keep and bear Arm~ shall not be infringed
- u.s. Constitution, amendment II

T

he meaning of the second amendment to the
Constitution and its impact on gun control
legislation served as not only the beginning
pOint, but also an underlying theme, of the
Law and Contemporary Problems Edi tarial Conference
on Gun Control. The conference, which was held at the
Law School and the Sheraton University Center on
October 19-21 , 1984, featured a great deal of spirited
discussion in addition to the presentation of materials
prepared for a forthcoming Law and Contemporary
Problems Symposium on the issue. The conference host
and moderator, as well as the Special Editor of the
Symposium, was Don Kates, a San Francisco attorney
known for his activity in the area of gun control.
TI1e controversial nature of gun control was highlighted from the start of the conference, when it became
apparent that the participants had diverse views of the
meaning of the short, but ambiguous, second amendment. The first topic of discussion, "The Second
Amendment;' was introduced by Professor Robert
Shalhope of the History Department of the UniverSity of
Oklahoma, who presented a paper entitled "The Armed
Citizen in the Early Republic." Professor Shalhope concentrated on explaining the premises underlying the
amendment by examining the philosophical framework
from which its authors began. He noted that, in the
current controversy over private possession and use of
firearms, those favoring freedom of individual ownership stress the "right to bear arms" phrase while their
opponents emphasize the "well regulated Militia"
phrase to support arguments restricting the use of firearms by those not connected with the militia. Professor
Shalhope concentrated on the "interrelationship linking arms, the individual, and society" as viewed through
the eyes of eighteenth century libertarians. He concluded that the individual right to bear arms was considered essential to prevent individuals from being subjected to the tyranny of governments, while the "well
ordered Militia" phrase was directed toward the philosophy of communal responsibility for the safety of the
community According to his reading of the reasons for
the amendment, "The Second Amendment included
both of its provisions because the Founders intended
that both of them be taken seriously. They intended to
balance as best they could individual rights with communal responsibilities."

Mr. Kates presented a slightly different historical
viewpoint while summarizing an article he had written
for the UniverSity of Michigan Law Review, 82 Mich. L.
Rev. 204-273 (Nov. 1983). According to Mr. Kates, the
view that tl1e second an1endment was intended to protect states' rights to arm their militias is based on a
twentieth century definition of "militia": the eighteenth
century viewpoint was that all citizens should be armed
and ready to defend their colony. Mr. Kates stated, however, that even if one accepts the wider, individual rights
view of the purpose of the second amendment, gun
control is not altogether precluded. He found that the
right to bear arms had three purposes in eighteenth
century America: individual protection; citizen law
enforcement; and military use. Thus, he concluded that
any weapon that is not useful for all three purposes can
be banned without violating the second amendment
(for example, 22 caliber handguns could be banned
because they have no military value).
A third historical perspective was introduced by one
of the commentators, Mr. David Caplan, a New York City
attorney who, in addition to his patent law practice, is a
member of the National Board of the National Rifle
Association. Mr. Caplan suggested that the second
an1endment should be analyzed in the context of the
eighteenth centUlY common law right to bear arms,
which protected all non-threatening private ownership
and use of arms. According to him, there was a tremendous communal benefit to allowing citizens to do away
with felonious predators. Mr. Caplan also stressed that,
insofar as private ownership of firearms presents a
potential-albeit slight-threat of armed rebellion,
that threat is a guarantee against a takeover of the
government by despots.
Finally, a pragmatiC view of the constitutional question was offered by Professor William Murphy of the
UniverSity of North Carolina School of Law: Professor
Murphy pointed out that no constitutionally guaranteed
rights, except the right to believe, are absolute; all of
them are subject to being balanced away be ends vs.
means analysis of an infringing law: Professor Murphy
also pointed out that, even if one or more of the foregoing historical analyses is correct, the Supreme Court
has exhibited a tendency to make selective use of history-sometimes even ignoring it altogether. He also
cautioned that any decision made by the Court on gun
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control legislation would be based, at least in part, on
contemporary policy
The second topic explored on the first day of the
conference was mandatory penalties for gun use. Professor Alan Lizotte of the Rutgers University Department
of Sociology discussed research that he had done with
Majorie S. Zatz for the Center for the Study of]ustice at
Arizona State University Professor Lizotte pointed out
that one strategy that has been attempted for controlling the use of guns by criminals is the enactment of
laws providing for enhanced sentences for those who
commit a crime with a firearm. After reviewing other
studies on the efficacy of these laws, he reported on his
and Zatz's study, "The Use and Abuse of Sentence
Enhancement for Firearms Offenses in California." They
studied length of prison sentences given in felony convictions in California over a three-year period. They
found that, although criminals who used a gun during
the commission of a felony should have received a sentence of at least one year longer than those who committed the same offense without a gun, this was not
usually the case. In fact, it was only when they considered those who had been convicted offil !e or more
felonies within the three-year period that they found
any statistically Significant variation in sentences between
gun-users and those who committed their crimes without the use of firearms. Thus, they concluded that
whether mandatory sentence enhancement affects gun
usage by criminals cannot be determined until judges
begin enforcing the laws that have been written.
Other participants in the conference included Professor Robert Batey of Stetson University College of Law,
who discussed "Stria Construction of Firearms Offenses:
The Supreme Court and the Gun Control Act of 1968;'
concluding that the Court's liberal reading of that act
has led to "abusive investigations and dubious prosecutions;' which, in turn, have strengthened opposition to
"even the mildest forms of gun contro!''' Professor James
B. Jacobs, of the New York University School of Law,
considered "Exceptions to a General Prohibition on
Handgun Possession: Do They Swallow up the Rule?"
Professor Jacobs pointed out that even statutes that pur-

Those favoring freedom of individual
ownership stress the ((right to bear arms"
phrase while their opponents emphasize
the ((well regulated Militia" phrase.
portedly prohibit private ownership and use of handguns, such as the widely publicized Morton Grove,
Illinois, law, contain broad exceptions for police officers,
private security guards, gun collectors, and so on, thus

leading one to question whether these laws can properly be characterized as "prohibiting" firearms.
Professor Daniel D. Polsby of Northwestern UniverSity School of Law offered "Reflections on Violence,
Guns and the Defensive Use of Lethal Force." Analyzing
the self-defensive use of firearms , in part under "games
strategies;' Professor Polsby concluded that "some
amount of private gun possession" might be helpful in
"keeping violence in the world to a minimum." Professor Polsby's use of utilitarian theory was challenged

Whether mandatory sentence enhancement affects gun usage by criminals
cannot be determined until judges begin
enforcing the laws.
in a thoughtful essay, "Close Encounters of the Lethal
Kind: The Use of Deadly Force in Self-Defense," presented by Professor Lance Stell of the Davidson College
Department of Philosophy
Professor Margaret Howard, of the Vanderbilt UniverSity School of Law, gave the last presentation on the
second day Her presentation on "Husband-Wife Homicide: An Essay from a Family Law Perspective" provided
some intriguing information (for instance, current
studies show that in spousal homicide cases, husbands
and wives are victims in approximately equal ratios,
although more wives are killed in the bedroom while
more husbands are killed in the kitchen), but Professor
Howard was unable to determine whether gun control
legislation would alleviate the problem of spousal
homicides.
On the final day of the conference, Professor Gary
Kleck of Florida State UniverSity'S School of Criminology discussed "Policy Lessons from Recent Gun
Control Research." After finding that privately owned
guns do have defensive value for their owners and do
deter criminal behavior to some extent, Professor Kleck
concluded that the status quo as to private gun ownership should be maintained for the most part. He would,
however, support laws prohibiting the sale of guns to
those with a history of violent mental instability or a
record of violent criminal offenses. He would also support a registration or licensing system by which civil
liability could be imposed on those who transferred
guns to someone without a permit.
The final presentation on the agenda, a discussion
by Don Kates and Professor Phil Cook of Duke UniverSity'S Institute of Policy Sciences on "Strict Liability
for Gun Manufacturers;' was cancelled because the
intense discussions on the earlier topics had caused the
schedule to go awry
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AConference Report

Federal Regulation of Work

"F

ederal Regulation ofWork from Recruitment
to Retirement" was the title given to a conference held at the Law School on November
17-18, 1984. The conference was sponsored
by Duke Law School Professors Richard Ma\.'Vvell,
Donald Horowitz, and C. Allen Foster. The articles presented at the conference will form the nucleus of a
forthcoming issue of Law and ContemporalJl Problems,
for which Professor Horowitz will serve as Special Editor.
The focus of the conference was on federal laws
enacted during the 1960's and 1970's that affected the
employment relationship. Particular focuses of discus~ion were laws dealing with employment discrimination,
health and safety regulation in the workplace, and retirement programs and policy
TIle first morning of the conference dealt with the
subject of older workers. Following a welcome by Dean
Paul Carrington and a short introduction by Professor
Horowitz, Professor Marilyn Yarbrough of the UniverSity of Kansas School of Law discussed the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and its impact o n
displaced homemakers. (Displaced ho memakers are
women who have been out of the workforce and dependent on their husbands for income, but whose ties to
um income have been severed due to divorce, death,
or other separation from their husbands.) Professor
\arbrough focused on the possibility of using "disparate
impact theory," as well as "disparate treatment theory,"
to redress employment discrimination against displaced
homemakers attempting to return to the work force.
A1Ulough not all courts accept the applicability of disparate impact theory, which was developed in race
discrimination actions under Title VII, to ADEA claims,
Professor Yarbrough noted that a case brought under
umtheory should be easier for a displaced homemaker
[0 prove than would be a case brought under the disparate treatment theory more often used in ADEA cases.
In the second presentation to focus on o lder workers, Professor Merton Bernstein of Washington UniverSity Law School discussed the Employment Retirement
Income Security Act (ERlSA), and particularly, the failures and shortcomings of private pension plans, which
induced the federal government to enact ERlSA in 1974.
Commentary on the morning's presentations was offered
by Allen Foster, Professor Emeritus Arthur Larson, and
111eodore Rhodes, of the Washington, D.C. , law firm of
Steptoe &Johnson.
Health and safety in the workplace was the concern
of the afternoon's presentations. Professor W Kip Viscusi
of Duke University's Fuqua School of Business dis-

Donald Horowitz

cussed 'The Structure and Enforcement ofJob Safety
Regulation" under the Occupational Safety and Health
Act (OSHA), and Professor Elinor P. Schroeder of the
University of Kansas School of Law discussed "Compensation for Occupational Disease." Professor Viscusi was
critical of the federal government's handling of safety
questions under OSHA and Professor Schroeder echoed
his sentiments while discussing proposed federal legis!ation to compensate workers suffering from asbestosrelated illnesses. She noted that "[tJhe same kind of
delay and industry opposition that has plagued OSHA
could easily befall a federal occupational disease compensation system."
The focus during the second day of the conference
was on employment discrimination law, particularly
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The two presentations reviewing the first twenty years under Title VII
were particularly interesting because the speakers presenting the two sides of the issue had often faced each
other in tlle courtroom. Discussing the employer's side
of the issue were Thornton H. Brooks and M. Daniel
McGinn of the Greensboro, N.C., firm of Brooks, Pierce,
McLendon, Humphrey & Leonard. They discussed
"Second Generation Problems Facing Employers in
Employment Discrimination Cases: Continuing Violations, Pendent State Claims, and Double Attorneys' Fees."
Although Mssrs. Brooks and McGinn felt that the use of
continuing violation theory and the appending of state
law claims to Title VII cases greatly expanded the bur-
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den on the employer, they appeared even more concerned with the chilling effect on the defense of an
action brought about by the employer's prospect of
being forced to pay not only its own attorneys' fees, but
also those of the plaintiff. They noted that, in several
recent cases, employers have been forced to pay plaintiffs' attorneys' fees of $2,000,000 and more, in addition
to backpay awards to the plaintiffs and their own attorneys' fees. They concluded that some system must be
devised to handle employment discrimination claims
without the tremendous expenses currently involved in
litigation.
Presenting the plaintiffs' view of twenty years of Title
VII wasjulius L. Chambers, now Director of the NAACP
Legal Defense Fund, but formerly a direct adversary of
Mssrs. Brooks and McGinn as a member of the former
Charlotte firm of Chambers, Stein, Ferguson & Becton.
Although Mr. Chambers agreed that new ways to litigate
Title VII cases should be found, his concern was that
these new ways must lead to the provision of meaningful relief for victorious plaintiffs. He noted that the

provision of meaningful relief was hindered by the
Supreme Court's expansive reading of the "bona fide
seniority system " exception to Title VII and by the
Reagan administration's opposition to affirmative action
In fact, he concluded, despite twenty years of litigation,
Title VII appears not to have accomplished its aims; the
continuing earnings and unemployment gap between
blacks and whites indicate that much remains to be
done.
The final presentation of the conference was an
extremely lucid discussion on the statistical proof of
employment discrimination through utilization of multiple regression analysis. Barbara A. Norris, a solo practitioner from Albany, California, managed to make multiple regression analysis seem understandable, a truly
amaZing feat in the eyes of any nonstatistician who has
ever attempted to fathom the mysteries of the subject.
Commentary on the mornings' presentations was offered
by Professor Douglas Laycock of the University of Texas
Law School.
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AConference Report

Tax Symposium

T

he tax legislation enacted during President
Reagan's first term and that proposed early
in his second term were the topics of discussion at a symposium held at the Law School,
January 10-12. Professor Richard Schmal beck, who
organized the symposium in conjunction with Law and
Colltemporary Problems, described the goal of the
conference:
We wanted to examine why we have had the explosion of tax legislation in recent years, what that legislation has done to our t<L,( system, and where we might be
headed in the future. The papers presented were a mix
of comprehensive treatments of these major themes,
and more concrete analyses of specific applications.

During the first day of dle symposium, participants
took a retrospective view of the tax changes which have
occurred over the past four years. Session topics
included "Movement toward a Consumption Base;' presented by Professor Charles O. Galvin of Vanderbilt
University Law School; "ReaganomiCS: The Revolution
in American Political Economy," presented by Rutgers
University Professor Charles E. Jacob, and "T<L'Cation of
Capital Income;' presented by Duke Law School Professor Pamela B. Gann.
Professor Galvin began his presentation by describing the accretion system of taxing income. Under a pure
accretion system, all assets would be ipventoried each
year, liabilities would be deducted, and the taxpayer's
net worth would be determined at market value. The
difference between beginning year and end-year net
worth, plus the taxpayer's expenditures for consumption for the period, would reflect the taxpayer's taxable
income for the year. Such a pure system would, in
Galvin's estimation, "immeasurably simplify the Code
and tax each individual on real economic income." It
""ould also mean the elimination of provisions regarding income excluSion; consumption deductions such as
personal interest and taxes, medical expenses, and
charitable contributions; tax free exchanges; corporate
reorganizations; and the capital gain-ordinary income
distinction. "Only through such a system could we
expect as simple and as equitable a statute as we could
hope to devise in a complex economy involving over
200 million people."
Galvin noted, however, dlat there are significant
objections to such a system. These objections are, primarily, that asset valuation each year would be difficult
for the taxpayer to determine and the IRS to administer;
that taxpayers with substantial asset appreciation could
have significant wherewithal! problems at tax time; and
that the transitional problems of providing everyone
with a "fresh start" each year would be troublesome.

Richard Schmalbeck

Under an accretion system, according to Galvin,
upper bracket taxpayers would pay more tax, even
dlough rates would remain constant, because net
unrealized appreCiation, currently excluded accessions
to wealth, and large consumption expenditures would
fall into the base, making it larger. Galvin speculated
that "[ t ]he overall effect of using the same rates would
be to raise somewhat more than twice the revenue as at
present, [and] to shift disproportionately more of that
additional burden to the upper brackets:' Lower and
middle income t<L'Cpayers would pay more than they do
currently to the extent that deductions were disallowed.
However, this would be a proportionate increase, with
lower income taxpayers relying on the zero bracket
amount to cover personal deductions.
Professor Galvin then discussed the consumption
system, in which taxpayer savings and investment fall
outside of the tax base. The base, under this system, is
measured by only that amount which is consumed
during the period. For the vast majority of taxpayers in
the middle and lower brackets, this system would produce results similar to those of the present system, widl
the exception that currently deductible personal consumption items would be included in the base, thereby
enlarging it. For upper bracket taxpayers, the base
wou ld be smaller because capital income would drop
out of the system.
In Galvin's opinion, the exclusive use of one of
these systems would be preferable to the present system,
which is a messy hybrid of the two, designed in random
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fashion to promote various social and economic goals.
The current system, however, has failed to achieve
broadly these goals and has resulted in unfairness
throughout and wide-scale evasion. Thus, concludes
Galvin, the President's tax reform efforts should focus
on moving toward a pure accretion system or a pure
consumption system. But, cautions Galvin, neither system would provide adequate revenue to overcome the
federal deficit and payoff the national debt, given the
present rate structure. He therefore suggests that a
broad based value added tax (VAT) system should be
layered on top of a new system, with appropriate minimum or vanishing credits to protect lower bracket
taxpayers.
Professor Charles Jacob shifted the day's discussion
to an assessment of Reagonomics, which spurred lively
conversation and sharp criticism from Duke Political
Science Professor James David Barber. Jacob began his
presentation by asserting that "the first year of the
Reagan Administration produced a set of changes in
political-economic relationships so novel as to merit
the denomination revolutionary" The evidence of such
a revolution, arguedJacob, lay in the specific actions of
the Administration: a reduction in personal taxes of
thirty percent over three years; accelerated depreciation
allowances for bUSiness; 49 billion dollars in domestic
program spending cuts; and a non-incremental approach
to defense spending. Jacob went on to say that these
fundamental alterations in American domestic revenue
collection and spending policies were the result of the
application of specific political resources marshalled by
the Administration: to set the policy agenda, to secure
adoption by Congress, and to manage the people
involved in the process. One of the most significant
resources used in the "revolution;' according toJacob,
was the presidential leadership exhibited by Ronald
Reagan. His ability to adhere uniformly to basic values
and political concepts, such as an unfettered economy
and the primacy of individualism, and to manage subordinates and public opinion effectively, created an environment and a system ripe for revolutionary changes. So

Apure accretion system ... would .. .
((immeasurably simplify the Code and
tax each individual on real economic
income."
effective was the revolution, asserted Jacob , that the
Congress passed dle Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA) a year later. Yet,Jacob assessed thi
move as a "Thermodorean reaction;' rather than a
counter-revolution-an event which involved consolidation and fine tuning of the Reagan revolution.
Reacting to the presentation, Professor James David

Barber argued that Reagan's 1981 legislative victories
were primarily explained by a conjunction of political
circumstances, such as media misinterpretation oftbe
1980 election, the disarray of the Democrats, and the
accident of his near assassination. Such circumstances
are unlikely to be repeated. or does tbe evidence support the supposition that American political values have
changed or that the Reagan "revolution" represents the
death or lapse of top level pragmatiSm.
The neutral taxation of capital income was the topiC
of Professor Pamela Gann's presentation. As Gann
explained, the first Reagan Administration responded to
the poor economic performance ofthe late 1970's and
early 1980's as if income ta.,"{ation of capital were "the
culprit." The Economic Recovery Tax Act CERrA) lowered the effective tax rates on capital income even
though Administration economists and others were
unsure to what the nation's sluggish and inflationary
economy was to be attributed. Some argued that overtaxation of capital income was resulting from the interaction of an unindexed tax base and high inflation.
Others countered that overall effective tax rates had not
Significantly increased because of inflation and that the
economic slowdown was a function of more profound
social and economic forces and in only small measure
attributable to the federal income tax.
Neverdleless, Gann continued, the Administration
proceeded with ERTA, a package of "reforms" which
unevenly lowered effective tax rates and left the base
unindexed. With the lowering of inflation, the ERTA
system created a new imbalance which resulted in "vel)'
low positive and even negative effective tax rates for
many investments." These misallocation effects have
prompted those involved in policy making to urge that
capital income should be taxed more neutrally with
respect to investment choice.
Gann then argued that a neutral income tax system
was achievable even though detractors argued that the
creation of a neutral system would require more political will than Congress can muster, and a more precise
measure of capital income than has yet been seen .
Gann suggested that the major problems with income
measurement had been solved in large part and that at
no time before had there been a more clear understanding of the workings of a neutral system. In fact, the
Treasury Department's 1984 tax reform proposals demonstrate that elements of neutrality can be placed in
legislative form and administered if passed. The primary stumbling block, believed Gann, was the mood of
Congress. She concluded by asking "where is the political will to achieve the goal of neutrality?"
Interesting presentations were also made by Professor Charles T. Clotfelter of the Duke University
Department of Economics as well as Mr. Don S.
Samuelson of Samuelson Associates in Chicago. Professor Clotfelter's evaluation of "Charitable Giving and
Tax Legislation in the Reagan Era" provided unusual
insight into the changing patterns of charitable giving in
the United States. His presentation demonstrated that,
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although the Reagan philosophy relies heavily on the
willingness and ability of the private sector to make a
host of charitable contributions to support various social
programs, the Reagan tax reform plans have the potential of having a negative impact on charitable giving. In
1983, individual donors contributed 54 billion dollars
to nonprofit charitable organizations. Bequests and corporate contributions equalled 7 billion dollars. Current
income and estate tax laws permit deductions for chari-

Reagan tax reform plans have the
potential of having a negative impact
oncharitable giving.
table gifts to individuals, while corporations may deduct
charitable gifts of up to 10 percent of net income. The
traditional view has been that an increase in tax liability
causes a decline in contributions, while a tax cut stimulates giving, if charitable giving is considered a normal
good and demand for it increases as disposable income
increases.
However, Clotfelter asserted that the recent Reagan
reforms, while creating a system under which more
lower and middle income taxpayers were able to make
charitable contributions, caused the cost of charitable
giving to corporations and wealthy individuals to rise
60 percent. Thus, between 1981 and 1986, gifts to religious organizations, given primarily by lower and
middle income taxpayers, are expected to increase 14
percent in real dollars. In sharp contrast, contributions
to cultural organizations, colleges and universities, and
other educational institutions are projected to decline
between 14 and 17 percent, in real terms, because of
the increased cost to upper-income individuals who
support such programs and institutions.
Likewise, in the estate tax area, Clotfelter foresees
similar increased cost of giving and thus fewer contributed dollars generated than under the prior tax system.
Yet, the giving picture is more promising now than if a
"flat" tax were introduced. According to Clotfelter, the
removal of the charitable deduction, along with all
other such deductions, would remove the "subsidy" for
giving which taxpayers now enjoy. Without this incentive, it has been estimated that individual charitable
contributions would drop by as much as one quarter.
Mr. Samuelson's review of real estate ta.'(ation during
the Reagan years focused on the use of municipal
bonds. He recounted the specific, detailed provisions of
municipal bond tax legislation of the Reagan years,
noting that, in his opinion, none of the measures would
have significant impact on municipal bonds as a whole.
However, Samuelson pointed out that changes made in
the law with respect to Industrial Development Bonds
or "!DB's" would result in fewer issues and different
purposes for those issues. Specifically, it was noted that

the elimination of an exemption for certain types of
small issue lOB's seemed to suggest that a public purpose test would be imposed at the federal level during
the small issue review process. Samuelson argued that
the thrust of all such changes was to provide the federal
government with more control over the uses of taxexempt financing and to limit the volume of tax exempt
debt by reducing lOB borrowing. The result of increased
controls on bonds and reduced availability of inexpensive debt financing, San1uelson asserted, would be
increased tax revenue for the government, lower yields
on available exempt bonds, and increased ownership of
bonds by the wealthy. This effect, in turn, would result
in reduced benefits from tax exemption and an increase
in the effective progressivity of the tax structure.
The second day of the symposium was devoted primarily to discussion of the Treasury Department's tax
reform proposals first announced in December, 1984.
Presentations were made by Mr. Willard B. Taylor of the
Sullivan and Cromwell law firm in New York City, and
Professor C. Gordon Bale of the law faculty at Queen's
University in Canada.
Mr. Taylor's paper outlined the recent changes to
Subchapter C and the tax poliCies which lay behind
those proposals. Taylor discussed the fact that changes
in Subchapter C had been accompanied by a continuing reduction in effective income tax rates. Interestingly, the income tax receipts from corporations in 1950
provided 28.3 percent of the total receipts for that year.
By comparison, this figure had declined in 1981 to 11.5
percent, and in 1983, to under 7 percent. Taylor went
on to say that many of the changes made to Subchapter
C strengtl1ened the system of double taxation of corporate income rather than achieving further integration.
Changes which made the most difference included the
elimination of non-recognition of income for distribution of property; the expansion of earnings and profits;
the extension of the accumulated earnings tax provisions; and the change in the treatment of acquisitions.
While not faulting the changes wrought by Subchapter
C legislation, Taylor did argue that the piecemeal repeal
of the General Utilities doctrine was confuSing and
distorting; that pass-through entities had not been adequately treated; and that recapture provisions were
inadequate to meet the demands of the Accelerated
Cost Recovery System (ACRS).
Dr. Bale provided conference participants with a
Canadian view of the Treasury Department's proposals.
Interestingly, the Carter Royal Commission developed
many of the same reform proposals nearly two decades
ago. As the Canadian government discovered, however,
political realities greatly reduced the extent to which
the measures could be implemented, even though the
tax base would have been broadened and revenues
enhanced.
The symposium concluded with a round table discussion of all the proposals at issue. The discussion was
conducted by Professor S. Malcolm Gallis of the Duke
University Department of Economics.
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Duke Goes to Phoenix
Duke Law School has traditionally sought to provide a high quality
legal education that would prepare
its graduates to practice in any area
of the United States. At the same time,
the school has endeavored to maintain a geographically diverse student
body. It is therefore not surprising
that quite a few Duke graduates today
have successful and rewarding
careers not only on the Eastern Seaboard but also in distant cities such
as Los Angeles, Houston, and San
Francisco.
It is perhaps somewhat more
unusual to find Duke graduates practicing law in a city like Phoenix, Arizona, often associated with movie
westerns and the law of the six-gun.
However, Phoenix has long outgrown
its reputation as a rough and ready
cowtown and a number of Duke
alumni and alumnae are pursuing
interesting careers there.
The Phoenix metropolitan area,
which includes such suburbs as the
posh Scottsdale area and the univerSity town of Tempe, now has a population of about 1.7 million. Phoenix
proper has a population of approximately 790,000. The City has grown
culturally as well. It has its own symphony orchestra, a metropolitan
ballet compan)~ and a number of
museums. And, of course, Phoenix is
renowned for its fair weather.
Although temperatures soar well
above the 100 degrees Fahrenheit
mark in the summer months, PhoenL,(
re idents enjoy winter temperatures
in the 60's and 70's and sunshine
60% of the year.
The number of lawyers practicing
in Phoenix has quadrupled in the
past twenty years. On July 5, 1984,
the Arizona State Bar Association estimated that there were about 4,647
lawyers in the Phoenix metropolitan
area-3,600 in Phoenix proper.
About thirty of those lawyers are
Duke Law School graduates. They
practice in a variety of areas, ranging .
from medical malpractice to environ-

mental law.
One Duke graduate is a highlyrespected judge on the Arizona Court
of Appeals. Judge Thomas Kleinschmidt grew up in Clayton, Missouri.
He decided to attend Duke in 1962
when a representative of the school
visited his college. When he graduated in 1965, Kleinschmidt felt Duke
had provided him with a "strong
springboard from which to begin
[his] career." Kleinschmidt chose to
move to Phoenix after having clerked
there for a summer withJennings,
Strauss, Salmon & Trask, the predecessor ofjennings, Strauss & Salmon.
After being admitted to the bar in
1966, Kleinschmidt continued to
work atJennings, Strauss and eventually becanle a partner in the firm.
Anticipating appointment to the
bench and anxious to diversify his
background, Kleinschmidt left
Jennings, Strauss in 1971 to work for
the Public Defender's Office under
Tom Karas, another Duke alumnus.
In 1977, Kleinschmidt was appointed
to the Superior Court for Maricopa
County He found trial work "enormously satisfying" and earned a rep-

Roger Ferland

utation as an excellent trial judge.
Five years later, Kleinschmidt was
appointed to the Arizona Court of
Appeals. He finds the thoughtful
analysis required by appellate work
as rewarding as trial work. According

to Karas, Kleinschmidt is "an outstanding appellate judge."
Anlong his recent opinions are
State l~ Stewart, an armed robbery
case which concerned the troubling
issue of shackling defendants at trial,
and State I I Ho!stun, which discussed
the issue of whether or not a trial
judge should be required to articulate his reasons for accepting a sentence stipulated in a plea bargain
when the stipulated sentence is to a
term longer than the presumptive
term for the reduced charge.
Kleinschmidt enjoys his work
immensely, and has a great deal of
respect for the legal system in Arizona. "It is largely free of the seanlY
customs one hears of in some areas.
... The system has a good clean tradition and works the way it should."
Roger Ferland, unlike Kleinschmidt, is a Phoenix native. He
chose to attend Duke because of its
reputation. He was unsure of where
he wanted to practice after graduating and wanted to leave his options
open. Ferland also found Duke's
small urban setting appealing. Commenting on the education he
received at Duke, Ferland said the
school "taught me to think like a
competent, ethical attorney."
When Ferland graduated in 1974,
he returned to Phoenix to practice.
At that time, he became associated
with Paul Castro's 1974 campaign for
governor of Arizona. He was responsible for drafting the candidate's
issues papers. After the campaign,
Ferland accepted an appOintment as
Administrative Counsel for the Arizona Department of Health Services.
He assisted in the drafting of the
Hospital Certification of Need Laws
and Regulations and was involved in
a number of administrative decisions
made under them. While in that position, Ferland said, "I saw Professor
Havighurst's concepts substantially
borne out in the real world." He also
commented that he had perceived
the direct influence of Professor
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Arthur Larson's work.
In 1977, Ferland became Senior
Counsel to the Environmental Protection Section of the Attorney General's Office. While there, he did
environmental work exclusively. He
was largely responsible for rewriting
all of Arizona's Air Pollution Regulations in 1979. The new regulations
were innovative in that they committed to words a complex graph
designed by University of Arizona
specialists to ensure that, given variations in meteorological conditions
and emissions content, there would
never be excessive amounts of sulphur dioxide pollution in Arizona's
atmosphere.
Three and a half years after the
regulations were submitted, they
were approved by the Environmental
Protection Agency. Shortly thereafter,
the Environmental Defense Fund
sued the Environmental Protection
Agency for its approval of the regulations. In Kamp v. Hernandez (Feb. 5,
1985), a Ninth Circuit panel affirmed
the EPA's approval of Arizona's "multipoint implementation plan for the
control of S02 emissions from copper melters." The EDF petitioned for
rehearing en bane.
Since 1981, Ferland has been in
private practice, doing environmental
defense work for the Phoenix firm of
Twitty, Sievewright & Mills. Ferland
regards his practice as something like
preventive medicine. He often
requests his clients to read pertinent
cases before meeting with him. "It is
my firm belief that clients need to be
educated about relevant issues of
environmental law so that they can
make intelligent decisions in their
corporate planning."
Ferland recently wrote an article
on alternative regulatory approaches
that appeared in the 1984 edition of
the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law
Institute. In September, he addressed
a group of corporate environmental
affairs specialists at a Hazardous
Wastes Symposium held in Phoenix.
He spoke about the legal issues that
arise when a purchaser of real property discovers the purchased land to
be contaminated with hazardous
wastes.
According to Ferland, "The

From top left, clockwise: Andy Friedman, Al Shrago, Bob Hackett, Bill Kurtz.

essence of environmental law is the
resolution of conflict between the
equally valid interests of the public
in a clean environment and business
in survival." Ferland finds the creative
challenges involved in resolVing tl1at
conflict particularly rewarding.
Larry Haddy was born in Iowa
and spent most of his life there until
he went into the service. In 1968, he
was stationed in Fort Huachaca, Arizona, and "fell in love with the state."
In 1970, when Haddy was in Vietnam,
he was admitted to Duke Law School.
"I still remember the day my mudsplattered acceptance letter arrived
in camp:' Haddy returned to tlle
United States to enter Duke that fall.
Haddy had not forgotten his days
in Fort Huachaca and decided to
practice in Phoenix because it was
tlle largest city in Arizona. He spent
the summer after his second year
working as a Superior Court bailiff in
Phoenix and, after graduating in
1973, he returned to Phoenix to clerk
for the Honorable Walter E. Craig, a
federal district court judge. Following his clerkship, Haddy joined the
small Phoenix firm of Carson,
Messenger, Elliot, Laughlin & Reagan,
where he became a litigation partner
doing primarily bank and insurance
defense work.
In 1981 , the opportunity to strike
out on his own arose and Haddy left
Carson, Messenger. He and two other
attorneys, Karasek and Rayes, set up
an overhead-sharing arrangement.

They share only common expenses;
othelwise, each attorney is responsible for his own risks and reaps the
full benefit of his rewards.
Haddy describes his present
practice as a "general civil practice."
He handles matters ranging from real
estate and commercial litigation to
personal injury and domestic relations cases. He also does some bankruptcy work. Any criminal cases that
come into the office are handled by
his associates.
Haddy finds the independence
and diversity of his practice satisfying. He also very much enjoys living
and working in Phoenix. "It's a vacationland year-round." According to
Haddy, the city's warm and relaxed
atmosphere is also reflected in the
legal sphere. "Problems like late discovery are often handled with a
simple phone call; you don't have to
file papers with the court."
Three of four Duke graduates
who are now members of the Phoenix firm of Evans, Kitchell &Jenckes
were also interviewed for this article.
They share Haddy's appreciation of
Phoenix's lifestyle and legal climate.
Andy Friedman, a native of New
Jersey, moved to Phoenix after graduating from Duke in 1978. What initially attracted him to Phoenix was
Evans, Kitchell. The firm 's atmosphere and litigation practice appealed
to him. Toda)~ he is a litigation partner at tlle firm and handles a variety
of civil cases. Friedman finds Phoenix
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culturally interesting and enjoys the
fact that one can live in very pleasant
neighborhoods within five minutes
of one's job. He also appreciates the
informal manner in which matters
like extensions can be handled.
AI Shrago, a member of the class
of '77, is a native of North Carolina.
He too moved to Phoenix after graduating from Duke primarily because
of Evans, Kitchell. He had clerked
there after his second year and felt
"the firm was the sort of place in
which I could practice for the rest of
my life." Like Friedman, Shrago is a
litigation partner at the firm. Last
February the United States Supreme
COurt heard argument in Kerr-McGee
Corp. L~ Navajo Tribe, a case in which
Shrago was lead counsel for the business. The Court decided that KerrMcGee will have to pay taxes,
imposed by the Navajo tribe, on mineralleases on Navajo property.
Phoenix, according to Shrago, is
unique among cities of its size. "It's a
major metropolitan area with most
of the opportunities available elsewhere, professionally and otherwise;
yet it offers a more small-town quality
of lifestyle:' In particular, it is a city
that "offers attractive opportunities
to lawyers recently graduated from
law school."
Bob Hackett graduated some ten
years earlier than Shrago and
Friedman. Professor Weistart was
then a member of the student body
After graduating, Hackett returned to
New York to practice. He had spent
four years with a Wall Street firm
when Evans, Kitchell, as he put it,
"made me an offer I couldn't refuse."
He is now a partner in the firm's
corporate department. Hackett
misses neither the practice nor the
lifestyle of New York. He finds Phoenix "rich and diverse culturally" and
he enjoys the more relaxed atmosphere of the city.
Friedman, Shrago, and Hackett
share positive feelings about the
quality of the legal education they
received at Duke. Duke provided
them with the analytical skills that
they all agree are the key to good
legal craftsmanship, whether in the
field of litigation or corporate work.
Friedman, in particular, remembers

Clause. Six or seven other sections
fell in cases following United States v.
Cleveland and the entire chapter was
eventually amended to provide equal
punishment for offenders of all races.
In 1971, the Public Defender program became national. Karas
remained at the Phoenix office until
1975, when he left to join Lewis &
Roca, one of the largest firms in
Phoenix. Karas had been a partner at
Lewis & Roca for seventeen months
when he decided that he needed
more independence. He has been a
sole practitioner ever since.
Today, Karas is considered one of
Norman Herring
the foremost criminal defense lawyers in Arizona. He is listed in both
Donald Beskind's Trial Practice
The Best Lawyers in America and The
course. He recalls, "Beskind opened Directory ofLegal Professions. About
my eyes to the fact that you don't
fifty percent of Karas's usual caseload
have to be bombastic to be a good
involves charges of white collar
trial lawyer. The course was one of
crime; the rest are charges such as
the primary motivating factors that
murder and rape. He is very selective
led to my chOice to go into litigation:' about the cases he takes. They must
involve fact situations or legal issues
Tom Karas, originally from Chiof particular interest to him.
cago, moved to Phoenix after he
graduated from Duke in 1959. Since
For example, in State v. Flynn,
that time, he has devoted his career
Karas successfully defended Flynn, a
to criminal law. Karas began his prohighly respected physician, president
of the Arizona Medical Association,
fessionallife as a Maricopa County
Attorney He then went on to become and an Arizona State Senator who
an Assistant United States Attorney,
was instrumental in the passage of
Chief of the Criminal Division for the Arizona's Child Abuse Reporting
District of Arizona.
Statute. After the statute was passed,
Flynn was indicted for allegedly failIn 1965, Phoenix became the
home of the first Public Defender
ing to report a child abuse case. It
Pilot Program in the United States.
was the one of the first cases in the
Karas was asked to run the program.
United States in which a physician
was prosecuted for failure to report
Of the nine lawyers Karas hired, five
are now judges. Kleinschmidt was
child abuse.
Karas has also been active outone of those five lawyers. Kleinschmidt recalls, "Karas was wonderside his practice. He sat on the American Bar Association Criminal Justice
ful to work for. He was fiercely
Section for eight years during which
independent, scrupulously honest,
diligent, and inventive about probing he became Vice-Chairman, ChairmanElect, and finally, Chairman of the
areas of the law to develop new
Section. Then Dean Kenneth Pye also
rights:'
sat on the Section for several of the
Karas remembers how he and
years when Karas was there. Karas
Kleinschmidt worked together on
cases involving sections of the United recalls, "Pye was a real healing presence between the prosecution and
States Code that then provided for
punishment applicable only to Amer- defense factions of the Section."
When Pye left to become Chancellor
ican Indian criminal offenders.
at Duke UniverSity, he was sorely
United States v. Cleveland was the
first case in which the court held that missed.
It was largely Karas's initiative that
such disparate punishment violated
led to the use of video-tapes and the
the equal protection component of
institution of a more demonstrative
the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
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educational approach at the ational
College for Criminal Defense in
Houston. He chaired two terms of
the Board of Regents of the College.
Karas now serves on the Board of
Governors of the Arizona State Bar.
Karas remembers Duke for its
small classes and its rigorous educational program. He attributes a good
deal of his success to the training he
received at Duke.
Another Duke alumnus who
looks back at Duke from the perspective of a number of years of practice
is Norman Herring. Herring was a
member of the first graduating class
of Duke Law SchooL Born in a silver
mining camp in Nevada, Herring and
his family moved to Douglas, Arizona, when he was still a small boy
One of his ancestors was a prominent lawyer in Arizona in the TerritOrial Days. When Herring entered
Duke Law School in 1931 as a transfer student from the UniverSity of Arizona Law School, he had no intention of practicing anywhere other
than Arizona. He is, and always had
been, as he puts it, "a desert man."
Herring chose to attend Duke
because, "I wanted a first-rate legal
education and the broadening experience of living somewhere other
than Arizona." According to Herring,
his class was hand-picked for its high
degree of scholarship and for its geographic diversity The studentprofessor ratio was nearly one-to-one
in those days. Justin Miller, then
Dean of the Law School, held early
morning classes over coffee at his

home.
Herring also remembers his sales
and contracts professor, Malcolm
McDermott. Professor McDermott
apparently wore glasses on a string
and when making a particularly salient pOint, would let the glasses fall
from his nose and fix the class with a
stony gaze. "'Gentlemen; McDermott
would say, 'This is the law.'"
When Herring returned to Arizona in 1933, there were only three
or four hundred lawyers in the state.
Herring felt that the intense educational experience he had had at
Duke made him one of the besttrained lawyers in the state. Duke
had also, Herring says, instilled in
him a strong sense that "the basic
responsibility of a lawyer to society is
greater than the lawyer's need for
money"
Herring was admitted to the Arizona bar in 1934 and began his
career as a general practitioner. He
worked in Tucson and Douglas for
some years before settling in Phoenix. In 1949, while still in Tucson, he
began to specialize in personal injury
and worker's compensation litigation. He attended a number of medical seminars for lawyers taught by
Professor Hubert Winston Smith.
Gradually, Herring found that he had
a natural aptitude for medical lore. If
he carefully studied anatomy and the
relevant literature, he could become
an "instant expert" in a particular
area of medicine. He was one of the
first members of the National Association of Claimants Counsel of

America, the forerunner of the American Trial Lawyers Association.
Since 1959, Herring has been
legally blind. He has no central vision
and only 2% peripheral vision.
Nonetheless, Herring still maintains
a vigorous practice. In 1968, he
passed the California Bar Exam with
one of the highest scores. He is one
of the best-known medical malpractice lawyers in Phoenix. Last year, he
was the subject of an article on medical malpractice that appeared in the
Phoenix: Gazette, a local newspaper.
As he stated in that article, Herring feels he is "'the place of last
resort for people injured by doctors'
carelessness.' " However, Herring
declines to accept about nine of
evety ten cases that come to him. He
does careful preliminary research of
all potential cases and accepts only
those in which he feels the plaintiffs
legal expenses will be justified by the
probable award. Malpractice awards
and settlements are not only a means
of earning a living to Herring. They
also serve to fulfill the ethical duty he
feels lawyers owe to society by deterring bad doctors and raising the standard of practice of medicine.
Duke Law School is still probably
best-known in the East. However,
many Duke graduates have chosen to
pursue their careers in the Western
states. A number of them are now
living in Phoenix, Arizona. They haye
found the city's climate and lifestyle
ideal and its practice of law both
broad and challenging.
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SPECIALLY NOTED

Obituaries
CharlesH.
Livengood, Jr.
Charles H. Livengood,Jr., a
nationally known labor law expert,
died at Duke Hospital on October
10,198'-1, after a long illness. He was
~3.

Professor Livengood, a Durham
native, attended Duke University and
graduated in 1931. He later entered
Harvard University and earned his
la,,' degree in 1934. He was associated with two New York law firms
before joining the United States
Department of Labor as regional
attorney for Kentucky and Tennessee
shortly before World War II. During
the war, he served as a lieutenant
commander in the Navv He was later
cited for meritorious service during
ule Solomon Islands campaign.
After the war, Professor Livengood returned to Durham, where he
briefly entered private practice before
joining the Duke Law faculty in 1948.
During his years at Duke, he served
as UniverSity Marshall from 1953 to
1961. He also taught at several other
univerSities, including the University
of Sydney, where he was a Fulbright
lecturer. He was the author of Federal
WhgeandHour Law, and a contributor to numerous legal journals.
Professor Francis Paschal, remembering Professor Livengood's years at
Duke, noted that Professor livengood had the reputation of being the
finest seminar instructor at the law
school, and was regarded highly by
his students. Professor Paschal also
recalled Professor Livengood's good
humor and spirit, often masked by a

certain reserve. Professor John
Weistart, a student and colleague of
Professor Livengood, noted his clarity
and precision in writing.
Professor Livengood held several
governmental posts throughout his
career. He served as a consultant to
the United States Senate subcommittee on labor relations in 1950.
Between 1957 and 1960, he was an
arbitrator with the Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service, the American Arbitration Association, and the
North Carolina Department of Labor.
He had been a member of the state

Charles H. Lil'engood, jr:

General Statutes Commission since
1966, serving as chairman in 1970,
and vice-chairman from 1962 to 1970.
Professor Livengood is survived
by his wife, Virginia, and a son,
Charles H. Livengood, III.

John S. Bradway
On January 2, 1985, Professor of
Law Emeritus John S. Bradway died
after a brief illness in Eureka, California. Born in 1890 in Swarthmore,
Pennsylvania, Professor Bradway
earned his undergraduate degree at
Haverford College and his U.B. from
the UniverSity of Pennsylvania. He
held honorary degrees from Haverford College and California Western
UniverSity He was a member of Phi
Beta Kappa and Order of the Coif.
After service in the Navy during World
War I, several years in private practice in Philadelphia, and brief teaching asSignments at the University of
Pennsylvania and the University of
Southern California, Professor
Bradway came to Duke in 1931.
During his time at Duke, Professor Bradway focused his research
activities on the interrelationship of
law and social work, on clinical legal
aid instruction, and on domestic
relations. He is probably best remembered for his emphasis on clinical
training for law students through
legal aid programs for the poor. He
was the Founder and Director of the
Duke Legal Aid Clinic, and authored
numerous books on the subject,
including Clinical Instruction for
Law Practice, Basic Legal Aid Clinic
Materials and Exercises, and Law
and Social Work. Mr. Matthew S. Rae,
Jr., a graduate of the law school, pupil
of Professor Bradway, and past
Supreme Justice of Phi Alpha Delta
Law Fraternity, said of him:
Thousands of underprivileged citizens who never heard of him owe
Professor Bradway their thanks for
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his pioneering work which resulted , Mental Hygiene Society and the State
in today's national system of legal
Legislative Council from 1947 to
aid clinics. He indeed left the nation 1949. Professor Bradway retired from
richer than he found it.
Duke in 1959.

From 1922 to 1942, Professor
Bradway served as Secretary and
President of the National Association
of Legal Aid Organizations. In 1948,
he chaired the Legal Aid Committee
of the American Bar Association. He
also served on numerous state commissions and boards, including the
North Carolina Probation Commission, and the Commission to Study
Domestic Relations Laws. He was
president of the Nordl Carolina

After leaving Duke, Professor
Bradway taught at California Western
University School of Law in San
Diego and at Hastings College of Law
from 1960 to 1965. He later returned
to California Western, where he
taught until his final retirement from
teaching in 1973, at the age of 83. At
the time of his death, Professor
Bradway was working on a collection
of essays dealing with law and legal
education.

John S. Bradway

For Attorneys, CP&, Trust Officers, CLU's, and Other
Estate and Financial Planners
The Duke University School of
Law and The Duke University Estate
Planning Council will present the
Seventh Annual Estate Planning Conference on the campus of Duke UniverSity in Durham, North Carolina,
October 17-18, 1984. An outstanding
and nationally known faculty will
present a program of timely and
practical interest to all members of
the estate planning team.
Subjects on the program will
include: The Treasury View of Tax

Reform; Gifts and Sales of Partial
Interests in Property (Life Estates and
Remainders); Income Tax Planning;
The Role of Charitable Giving in
Estate Planning; The Use ofInsurance
in Estate Planning; Estate Tax Planning; Gift Loans- Proper Subject for
a Gift; The New South Executive; The
Marital Deduction Revisited; General
Administration of Estates; IRD-The
Atomic Bomb in the Estate of a Professional Partner; The Year in ReviewAn Estate Planner's Perspective on Tax

Developments.
The conference is designed fOI
continuing education credit. Partie
pation is limited to 175. Fee $250 . .
information write or call:
Roland R. Wilkins, Director
7th Annual Duke University Est
Planning Conference
PO. Box 3541
Durham, NC 27710
Telephone: (919) 684-4429

Agenda

Law Alumni Weekend, November 1-2, 1985
Friday, November 1, 1985
2:00 p.m. Registration Desk Opens-Lobby,
Law School
3:00 p.m. Law Alumni Council MeetingLaw School
6:00 p.m. Cocktails, Lobby, Paul M. Gross
Chemical Laboratory
7:30 p.m. Dinner on your own
Saturday, November 2, 1985
9:00 a.m. Coffee-Danish, Hallway, adjacent to
Moot Courtroom
9:15 a.m. Professional Program-Moot Courtroom
11 :00 a.m. Pig Pickin' BBQ Luncheon, Back Lawn,
Law School

1 :30 p.m.

(If rain, Portico of Gross Chem.)
Duke vs. Georgia Tech

REUNION CLASS PARTIES

6:30 p.m.*
8:00 p.m~

Cocktails, Sheraton University Center
(each reunion class will have its own paD
Dinner, Sheraton University Center
(each reunion class will have its own pM

*Should dle University decide to reschedule the afternoon football game to an evening game, the reunion
parties will be held earlier (Le., 4:00 p.m. for cocktai!l
and 5:00 p.m. for dinner).

CHANGE OF ADDRESS
Name _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Class of _ _ _ __
Position,firm _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Office address _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Officephone _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Homeaddress _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ __ _ __
Homephone _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

PLACEMENT
Anticipated opening for third D, second D, and/or first D year law students, or experienced attorney D.
Date position(s) available _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ __
Employer's name and address _ _ __ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Person to contact _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Requirements/comments _ _ _ _ __ __ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

oI would be willing to serve as a resource or contact person in my area for law school students.
oI would like to be placed on the mailing list for the Placement Bulletin.

Submitted by:

Class of _ _ _ __

ALUMNINEWS
Name _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Classof _ _ _ __
Address _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
~on e

_ __ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ __ __

News or comments _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
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